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INTRODUCTION
Unauthorized practice of immigration law (UPIL),' often called "notario fraud, "2
continues to be rampant in the United States.3 Practitioners of UPIL are individuals or
1. UPIL is a distinct kind of unauthorized practice of law (UPL). Federal law, federal regulations, and federal
judicial and administrative precedent govern the substance, procedures, and processes of immigration, including who
may lawfully represent or otherwise assist individuals in immigration cases. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1778 (2013). Authorized representatives are limited to attorneys in good standing, federally accredited
representatives who can only work under prescribed circumstances and only for federally recognized non-profit organi-
zations, and other narrowly construed categories of people whose assistance must be case-bound, provided without
remuneration, and approved by the adjudicator. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.1 (2013). Federal immigration law also defines the
conduct that constitutes legal practice, assistance, and representation in immigration cases. See id. § 1001.1 (providing
relevant definitions); infra Part IV (providing a more detailed discussion).
2. "Notario" is a term misunderstood in many Latino immigrant communities in the United States to mean a
person with legal expertise and authorization to practice law, including immigration law. It derives from the Spanish
language phrase "notario publico" which, literally translated, means notary public. Unlike state-licensed notaries in the
United States who perform limited non-attorney functions, in many Spanish-speaking countries a "notario" is an attor-
ney or law-trained professional licensed to practice law. A common form of UPIL occurs when fraudsters working in
Latino communities identify themselves as "notarios" without explaining that they are not authorized to practice law in
the United States. See, e.g., Andrew F. Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Unmet Needs: A Look at
State Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2004) (explaining that notarios often rely on
immigrants' cultural and linguistic misunderstandings as well as their lack of familiarity and knowledge about the U.S.
legal system to persuade those looking for immigration assistance that they have the expertise and credentials to assist
them). Notario fraud in Latino communities has linguistic and cultural analogues in other immigrant populations. See id.
at 5-6. For example, eastern European immigrants sometimes turn to travel agents for assistance in regularizing their
legal status because in their home countries, travel agents can help secure immigration visas. Id. In Chinese communi-
ties, asylum seekers are often directed to appearance attorneys by the travel agents or smugglers, also known as
"snakeheads," who helped arrange their passage to the United States. See Richard L. Abel, Practicing Immigration Law
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organizations that (1) "hold themselves out as immigration law experts, even though they are
not attorneys" or (2) "act as gatekeepers for 'appearance attorneys' with limited or no
knowledge of their client's immigration case."4 Individuals properly accredited through a
federally recognized organization charging only nominal fees are excluded from this
definition.5
Although notarios sometimes provide useful services, 6 they can irreparably damage
the lives of immigrants7 and their citizen family members.8 Families are separated, and indi-
viduals are deported to countries they scarcely remember and where they often have no
relatives or friends. Immigrants may lose thousands of hard-earned dollars to scammers who
falsely promise "papers" that would allow them and their families to live lawfully in the
United States. Immigrant workers and their families can lose their livelihoods, and U.S. em-
ployers lose valuable workers. UPIL also compromises the rule of law and faith in the U.S.
legal system.
in Filene's Basement, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2006) (discussing case studies of smuggling in Chinese immigrant
communities). Other common terms used by non-lawyers who engage in UPIL are "immigration consultants," "visa
consultants," and "immigrant assistants." Id. at 1488.
3. See Mendoza-Mazariegos v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1074, 1077 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the "immigration
system in this country is plagued with 'notarios' who prey on uneducated immigrants").
4. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 675 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011). Gatekeeper notarios are also referred to as "in-
termediaries." See Abel, supra note 2, at 1488. They characteristically "charg[e] clients; choos[e], switch[], and pay[]
lawyers; collect[] and translat[e] documents; maintain[] the file; 'prepar[e]' clients for hearings; interpret[]; and even
choos[e] litigation strategies... . In some cases the client will not even know who his lawyer is ... who is actually doing
the work for him." Id. at 1488, 1488 n.312 (quoting JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON TiiEm OWN 163 (1962)).
5. See infra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing federal and state regulation of immigration practice).
6. See, e.g., Anne E. Langford, What's in a Name? Notarios in the United States and the Exploitation ofa Vulnera-
ble Latino Immigrant Population, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 115, 126 (2004) (noting that "notarios have stepped forth to
fill the gap between the demand among Latino immigrants for affordable and culturally and linguistically competent
help from the legal community and the supply of such services.").
7. Unless otherwise indicated, in this article we use the word "immigrant" colloquially to mean any non-citizen
residing in the United States temporarily or permanently, with or without authorization. When we need to make clear
that an individual may be in the United States without authorization, we use the descriptors "undocumented" or "unau-
thorized." Where appropriate, we also use the word "alien." The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines an
"alien" as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). Under the
INA, "the term 'immigrant' means every alien except an alien who is within [an enumerated] class[] of nonimmi-
grant[s]." INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). The "immigrant" designation ordinarily refers to an individual who
intends to reside permanently in the United States but is not a U.S. citizen or national. See id. (defining "immigrant" by
way of exclusion). Synonymous terms for individuals with immigrant status include: permanent resident; green card
holder; and resident alien. A "non-immigrant" is an alien in the United States temporarily for a specific purpose permit-
ted by law. Id. Common nonimmigrant statuses include: visitors (B-1 visa holders); foreign students (F-1 visa holders),
agricultural and non-seasonal, unskilled workers (respectively, H-2A and H2B visa holders). See id. (listing classes of
non-immigrants).
8. We use the term "immigration consumer" to refer to non-U.S. citizens seeking immigration benefits or relief
from removal and their U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident family members or employers who want to assist them
in the process of seeking to reside lawfully in the United States.
REMEDIAL AND PREVENTIVE RESPONSES TO UPIL
Several factors contribute to the prevalence of UPIL: the sheer number of immigra-
tion consumers; 9 the multiple vulnerabilities of people seeking to obtain or retain immigra-
tion status;10 the scarcity of affordable and competent immigration representation;" and the
inadequate regulation and punishment of UPIL.12 A meaningful response to the problem of
notario fraud must address all of these realities.
In the last few years private and governmental actors have begun to challenge the
persistence of UPIL in several ways, including: (1) conducting campaigns to educate the
public about the harm that notarios can cause, how to identify the unlawful practice of immi-
gration law, and what individuals and communities can do about it;13 (2) enacting laws that
more effectively address unauthorized immigration practice;14 (3) undertaking capacity-
building efforts aimed at building a greater pool of lawyers and government-accredited rep-
resentatives to represent immigrants; 5 and (4) taking civil and criminal legal action against
alleged notarios.' 6 In a particularly welcome development, federal, state, and local govern-
ment actors increasingly coordinate these efforts with one another and with non-government
entities. 7
Current models for addressing notario fraud can be roughly conceptualized as: (1)
prevention-oriented actions such as regulation of immigration law-related practices, capacity
building, and public education; (2) remedial approaches such as civil and administrative re-
9. Approximately 39 million documented and undocumented foreign-born residents live in the United States.
See, e.g., CATr1oIc CHARITIES OF THI1I ARCDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON, PETITION TO THE FEDERAi TRADE COMMIS-
SION To TAKE ENFORCEMENT ACTION, AND PROMULGATE INDUSTRY GUIDANCE, AND CONSUMER EoUCATION CON-
CERNING DECEVflVE ACeS AND PRACflCES IN TI-IE IMMIGRATION CONSULTING INDUSTRY 3 (filed Feb. 3, 2009)
[hereinafter CAr11oIC CHARIrlES PETIION]; Judge Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs
of the Immigrant Poor (Feb. 28, 2007), in 62 THEL RECORD 287, 290 (2007) (citing then-Second Circuit Chief Judge John
M. Walker, Jr.'s 2006 estimate that immigration cases comprise approximately 50% of the circuit's docket).
10. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 2, at 1488 (explaining that immigrants are often poor, uneducated, "ignorant of
language and culture, and threatened with losing everything they have so painfully won"); Katzmann, supra note 9, at
292 (highlighting the vulnerabilities of immigrants).
11. See Katzmann, supra note 9, at 301 (describing the significant need among immigrants for competent legal
representation).
12. See Moore, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing the prevalence of UPIL practices and resultant setbacks to the
immigration administrative system).
13. See, e.g., CATHOLIC CHARITIES PETITION, supra note 9, at 17-18 (highlighting consumer education initiatives to
combat the unauthorized practice of immigration law).
14. See, e.g., id. at 14 (describing various legislative initiatives intended to address the unauthorized practice of
immigration law).
15. See infra Part VI (discussing capacity building efforts).
16. See, e.g., CATHOLIC CHARITIES PElITION, supra note 9, at 15-16 (describing state enforcement actions and
private litigation for violation of state consumer protection statutes).
17. See, e.g., USCIS Initiative to Combat the Unauthorized Practice of Immigration Law: Fact Sheet, U.S. CrIIZEN-
Sine & IMMIGR. SERVS., DiP'-T oF HOMELAND SI-C. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.
5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnextchannel=8a2f6d26dl7dfI1OVgnVCM100000471819OaRCRD&vgnextoid=25
d08fOcO4ccc2lOVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD (describing coordination of efforts between various governmental and
private entities).
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storative actions; and (3) deterrence measures such as enhanced enforcement and punish-
ment. These efforts depend on better reporting and information-sharing mechanisms among
government and non-government federal, state, and local actors. The Federal Trade Com-
mission's (FTC) "sentinel system," which collects reports of suspected fraud, is one such
example."'
In this article, we examine recent initiatives to fight UPIL and the roles played by
community-based organizations, federal, state, and local governmental agencies, national
professional associations, judges, private attorneys, and federal and state legislators. We con-
clude that these generally positive, but still piecemeal, approaches to combat UPIL could be
rendered more effectively with the adoption of multi-pronged strategies that consciously
seek to integrate legal actions, regulation and oversight, education, capacity building, and to
coordinate the work of diverse private and public actors at national, state, and local levels.
Isolated approaches to fight notario fraud will achieve limited success. Public educa-
tion, for example, goes only so far if immigrants and their families do not have access to
attorneys and federally accredited representatives competent in immigration law. Therefore,
capacity-building measures are as necessary as education campaigns. Similarly, the ability to
pursue successful legal remedies is limited because they require significant expenditures of
time, money, and labor, all of which immigrant families often lack. Criminal prosecution,
likewise, is money and labor intensive, especially given the evidentiary burden required to
prevail. Adopting legal rules to strengthen safeguards against UPIL results in mere negligi-
ble gains if unaccompanied by strong enforcement of those rules.
The authors urge public and private stakeholders to consider, in a deliberate manner,
how best to exploit the connections and complementary relationships that exist among pre-
ventive, remedial, and deterrent responses to notario fraud when developing anti-notario
strategies.19 In an effort to spur further thought about a comprehensive approach to reducing
UPIL as well as the individual and systemic harm it causes, this article brings together in one
18. See, e.g., Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/index.shtm (last vis-
ited Oct. 23, 2013) (describing the FTC's sentinel system).
19. The authors live and work in Idaho and Eastern Washington, largely rural areas. Historically, immigrant popu-
lations have been concentrated in urban areas; however, recent years have seen significant growth outside of major
cities. CATHOIC CHARITlES PriFuIoN, supra note 9, at 3. Procuring access to quality immigration assistance in the rural
United States is particularly challenging. The difficulties arise from geography, demographics, and virtually non-existent
public transportation. Small towns are separated by vast stretches of fields, rangeland, and wilderness. Many immigrants
in the region cannot obtain drivers' licenses or car insurance, or afford the cost of gasoline to drive long distances from
town-to-town. Immigrants in rural areas are often further isolated in remote labor camps. It is generally not cost-effec-
tive for attorneys to set up offices in such areas, and without private or public transportation, immigrants cannot travel
to secure appropriate representation. Such isolation makes it relatively easy for a notario who may be shut down in one
community to move a short distance away to start up in a new community without detection. Government and non-
governmental organizations in rural regions need to develop strategies to increase access to competent legal assistance,
and marshal enforcement and education resources efficiently to ultimately reduce instances of notario fraud.
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place an analysis of existing responses to the problem. As comprehensive immigration re-
form moves closer toward becoming a reality, the need for creative solutions grows even
more urgent.
In Part I, we categorize the kinds of harms notario fraud can inflict on individuals,
families, and the broader legal system. Part II discusses the limited procedures available to
victims of UPIL that try to "undo" harm to their immigration cases and offers a compendium
of legal remedies that may provide them monetary relief. This section addresses the applica-
tion of traditional remedial approaches, a model that has received relatively scant attention
in legal literature on UPIL. Part III lays out legal mechanisms that could potentially stop
individual notarios from repeating their UPIL. Part IV analyzes federal and state regulation
and sanctioning of unauthorized practitioners of immigration law. Parts V and VI address
public education efforts including reporting initiatives and capacity-building programs, re-
spectively, and stress the need for further joint actions among federal, state, and local gov-
ernmental and private entities.
I. HARMS CAUSED BY UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION SERVICE PROVIDERS
A. The Dangers of UPIL
The Ninth Circuit recognizes that "[t]he proliferation of immigration laws and regula-
tions has aptly been called a labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate." 20 The Supreme
Court is blunt in its assessment, acknowledging that "nothing is ever simple with immigration
law." 21 By entrusting their cases to notarios or to the appearance attorneys with whom
notarios sometimes work, immigrants face an elevated risk of irreparable harm to their
claims.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the regulations implementing its
provisions exceed 2,000 pages.22 Each year, federal appellate courts, the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or "Board") issue hundreds of deci-
sions interpreting immigration statutes and regulations. These decisions frequently turn on
the interaction of immigration law with federal and state laws and precedent that govern
subjects such as family relationships and criminal conduct.
20. Biwot v. Gonazales, 403 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005).
21. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 378 (2010) (quoting R. MCWHIRTER, AMER. BAR Ass'N, THE CRIMINAL
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION LAW: QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 130 (2d ed. 2006)).
22. See, e.g., Thomas West, FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS AND REGULATIONS (2013).
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Unlike what many immigration consumers believe-and what notarios often fail to
tell them-obtaining immigration benefits is not simply a matter of filling out forms cor-
rectly, paying application fees, living in the United States for a long time, or having U.S.
citizen relatives. Reliance on notarios for immigration assistance can result in the denial of
claims, deportation, and permanent inadmissibility. Trying to undo the harm is often impossi-
ble. The following examples illustrate several common problems.
1. Family-Based Immigration Law Examples
Contrary to popular perception, immigration through family members is limited and
turns on definitions of family peculiar to immigration law.23 For instance, in the immigration
context, an "immediate relative" refers only to the spouse, minor unmarried child, and
parent of a son or daughter twenty-one years of age or older who is a U.S. citizen. 24 The
spouse, minor unmarried child, and parent of a son or daughter twenty-one years of age or
older of a legal permanent resident are not considered "immediate relatives" under
immigration law; they fall into the "family preference" category.25 The distinction is huge.
Immediate relatives can become permanent residents when paperwork has been processed
and a successful adjudication is complete. 26 By contrast, family preference relatives often
have to wait years, sometimes decades, to become permanent residents and cannot live
lawfully in the United States during that time.27 Notarios often do not know or do not bother
to tell immigration consumers about this difference.
In most cases, both immediate relative and family preference beneficiaries who
entered the United States without inspection cannot become permanent residents by
adjusting status in the United States. Instead, they have to return to their home countries to
process their applications through a U.S. consulate. If they resided unlawfully in the United
23. Qualifying relationships are limited to spouses, children, parents of a child who is at least 21 years old, and
siblings of adult U.S. citizens. See INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151; INA § 203(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1153. Family-based immigration
is further constrained by laws that result in lengthy waiting periods-even after approval of a petition-before
individuals can apply for permanent resident status and live lawfully in the United States. See Family-based Immigrant
Visas, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_1306.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2013)
(discussing wait times for family-based immigrant visas). For example, the current waiting period for Chinese-citizen
sibling beneficiaries of petitions filed by U.S. citizens is approximately twenty-four years. See id. (showing that Chinese-
citizen sibling beneficiaries of petitions filed by their U.S. siblings in 1989 only became eligible to apply for legal
permanent residence in March 2013). The waiting period for Mexican spouses and minor children of lawful permanent
residents is approximately two-and-a-half years. See id. (providing an estimate of the waiting period). Mexican
unmarried sons and daughters of lawful permanent residents currently wait approximately twenty years. See id.
(providing an estimate of the waiting period).
24. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
25. INA § 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2).
26. See Family-based Immigrant Visas, supra note 23 (explaining family-based visa petitions and processing).
27. See Visa Bulletin, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://travel.state.gov/visalbulletin/bulletin_1360.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2013) (providing links to visa bulletins that indicate wait times).
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States for more than 180 days but less than one year, they are barred from return for three
years, notwithstanding an approved application.28 Immigrants who resided unlawfully in the
United States for more than one year are barred from return for ten years. 29 Notarios often
do not explain to immigration consumers that unlawful presence bars exist, and parents,
children, and spouses can find themselves separated from one another for the duration of the
re-entry prohibition.
Waivers may be available to individuals who establish that separation would cause
"extreme hardship" to their spouses or parents in the United States.3 0 In many cases, proving
extreme hardship is challenging. Although the INA does not define "extreme hardship,"
"mere separation" from family is not, by itself, considered to be sufficient for an extreme
hardship waiver.3' Competent attorneys and government-accredited representatives know
that demonstrating extreme hardship requires an evaluation of a family's circumstances to
determine whether there are factors that individually or cumulatively constitute extreme
hardship for purposes of the waiver. They also know that the waiver application must be
accompanied by ample documentation of the claimed hardship. Notarios often fail to advise
consumers about waiver options or that they must submit solid evidence of extreme
hardship.
2. Criminal Law Examples
Notarios also frequently do not know or do not bother to advise customers that
certain criminal convictions 32 with negligible consequences for U.S. citizens can result in the
removal of non-citizens (including legal permanent residents), no matter how long they have
lived in the United States.3 3 If such non-citizens file immigration applications, they risk the
28. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
29. INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(ll), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
30. INA § 212(a)(9)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(v). Note that immigration law does not provide for waivers for
extreme hardship to children. See id.
31. See, e.g., In re Teresa de Jesus Losada, 2004 WL 2952349, at *2 (BIA 2004) ("[M]ere separation from friends
and family has been held not to constitute . . . extreme hardship.").
32. The Supreme Court recently commented on a peculiarity of the meaning of "conviction" under the INA,
observing that "[a] disposition that is not a 'conviction' under state law may still be a 'conviction' for immigration
purposes." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 380 n.2 (2010) (citing In re Salazar-Regino, 23 1. & N. Dec. 223, 231, (BIA
2002) (en banc)). Additionally, a criminal conviction typically remains a conviction for immigration purposes
notwithstanding subsequent dismissal of the conviction by the adjudicating court. See Andrew Moore, Criminal
Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 Gio. IMMIR. L.J. 665, 668 (2008) (discussing
the treatment of dismissals by federal immigration agencies). Even an admission to the elements of a criminal offense,
without a conviction, can bar a non-citizen from lawfully entering or residing in the United States. INA § 212(a)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
33. For example, in the course of representing a non-citizen client who suffered from an eating disorder,
University of Idaho College of Law Immigration Clinic interns discovered that shoplifting a $5.00 box of laxatives could
be deemed a crime of moral turpitude for purposes of immigration law and preclude an otherwise eligible individual
from remaining in the United States. A guilty plea to the possession of a marijuana pipe typically precludes non-citizens
2014] 55
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government initiating removal proceedings against them and will have wasted thousands of
dollars pursuing an immigration status that they will never get. Unauthorized practitioners of
immigration law are also less likely to know about case law or statutory waivers that could
prevent removal.
B. Harms to Immigration Consumers
Stories of harm caused by notarios are legion.34 Harm typically falls into one or more,
and sometimes all, of the following categories: (1) removal-often to countries with which
immigrants no longer have ties or where they have experienced or risk serious physical
harm;35 (2) loss of documents needed to establish eligibility for an immigration benefit;36 (3)
bars to regularizing immigration status;37 (4) long-term or even permanent separation of
families;38 (5) financial damage caused by paying for useless or harmful procedures, including
payment for applications that are never filed;39 (6) loss of employment; 40 and (7) long-term
detention. 41 Harm can also be physical, as in the case of an asylum applicant who is tortured
or killed if deported to her country of origin because of UPIL.42 The following stories are
representative of hundreds of thousands of others.
from remaining in the United States, whereas a plea to a one-time possession of less than thirty grams of marijuana can
be waived. See INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (describing discretionary waiver for possession of thirty grams or less of
marijuana).
34. See, e.g., EuIZABETII COHEN, CAROLINE VAN WAGONER, & SARA WARD, To PROTECT AND SERVE: ACCESS
10 JUSTICE FOR VIcIrIMS OF NOTARIo FRAUD IN TiE NATION'S CAPITAL (2013), available at http://www.ayudainc.org/
index.cfm/news-protect-and-serve-justice-for-notario-fraud-victims; Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal
Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDIAM L. REV. 577, 584-86 (2009).
35. See infra notes 55-71 and accompanying text.
36. Many immigration claims, particularly those that require proof of long-time residence in the United States or
of persecution in an asylum applicant's home country, turn on documentation in the form of letters, photos, signed
affidavits, and records from foreign and sometimes defunct governments. Often only one copy exists of a required
document. If documents are lost, so too may be the ability to establish eligibility for lawful immigration status. For this
reason, immigration lawyers typically do not retain original documents until necessary for a formal CIS appointment for
adjudication or immigration court hearing. Ironically, attempts by law enforcement to shut down a notario's business
may inadvertently exacerbate the problem of missing documents if the offices of the notario become a crime scene, and
law enforcement retains paperwork as potential evidence in a criminal proceeding. See infra notes 43-51 and accompa-
nying text.
37. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
38. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
39. See Complaint, Idaho v. Perez (2010) (No. 2010-0056) [hereinafter Perez Complaint] (describing financial
harm to consumers).
40. See infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
42. The Indiana Supreme Court wrote the following regarding the unauthorized practice of immigration of law
and the potential for particularly horrifying consequences for individuals whose opportunities to obtain asylum are
ruined:
The practice of law without a license is not a 'victimless crime' because the legal interests of people
assisted by those who are not qualified to act as attorneys can be irreparably damaged. This is espe-
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1. Celia Perez's Customers
Celia Perez, operator of "an immigration and naturalization consultation service" in
Jerome, Idaho, is the subject of numerous complaints of notario fraud made by immigration
consumers and attorneys assisting individuals seeking to rectify the harm she caused.43
According to a 2010 complaint filed by the Idaho Attorney General under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act,44 Ms. Perez ran an immigration consultation business for many
years,4 5 charging customers thousands of dollars to perform tasks related to completing and
filing applications with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).4 6 Allegedly
misrepresenting herself to immigration consumers as an attorney,47 MS. Perez was in fact a
licensed Idaho notary public.4 8 Individual immigration consumers assert that they paid Ms.
Perez as much as $28,000 each over a period of several years to provide legal advice, prepare
and submit paperwork to USCIS, and cover fees charged by the agency.49 Some appear to
have been undocumented immigrants seeking to legalize their immigration status. Others
were in the United States lawfully and wanted to apply for citizenship or to assist others to
secure lawful immigration status. Ms. Perez's alleged victims stated that they were not trying
to buy forged immigration documents but rather that "they were trying to take the legal
route."50
Immigration consumers involved with Ms. Perez claimed not only irreparable
financial harm but also lost opportunities to regularize their status, missing documents,
emotional and physical harm, and deportation of family members. Although a default
judgment was entered against her, as of this writing, even people who subsequently retained
cially true in immigration cases, where the consequences of incompetent representation may be the
lost opportunity for permanent residence, deportation, and perhaps even death for unsuccessful asy-
lum seekers.
State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ind. 2005) (citation omitted).
43. See Perez Complaint, supra note 39; Andrea Jackson, Deputies Probe Possible Immigration Fraud in Jerome,
TIMES-NEws (Sept. 10, 2009), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/deputies-probe-possible-immigration-fraud-in-jerome/
article f574d9c7-2ba7-5c20-aOaO-8f88c6038f5e.html; Ashley Smith, Swindled Citizenship, TIMEs-NEWS (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://magicvalley.com/news/local/swindled-citizenship/image-df4b35el-9ece-5b41-914e-d3fe8l6f7fec.html.
44. IDAHO CODE ANN. H§ 48-601-48-619 (2012).
45. Perez Complaint, supra note 39, TT 7-8.
46. Id. 8.
47. Id. 9 8-9.
48. Id. 10. Idaho Code § 51-110 permits a notary public to charge no more than $2.00 for performing a notarial
act. The statute states in relevant part:
Official misconduct of a notary public includes: (a) engaging in fraudulent or deceptive conduct
related in any way to his capacity as a notary public .. . (c) representing or implying by the use of his
title that he has qualifications, powers, duties, rights, or privileges that by law he does not possess;
(d) engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
Id. § 51-112.
49. Perez Complaint, supra note 39, 12-14; see also Smith, supra note 43 (describing incidents involving Celia
Perez).
50. Jackson, supra note 43.
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competent counsel have not been able to recover documents she took from them or court-
ordered restitution.51 On October 8, 2013, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted Ms. Perez
on twelve charges of mail fraud related to her alleged notario activities after investigations
conducted by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, and USCIS.52 The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Idaho, which is
prosecuting the case, noted that mail fraud is punishable by up to twenty years in prison, a
maximum fine of $250,000, and up to three years of supervised release.53 A spokesperson for
the Idaho Attorney General stated that: "Now that [Ms. Perez] has been indicted, the state is
exploring its options trying to collect the [2011 civil court] judgment" against her for
defrauding immigration consumers; Ms. Perez pleaded guilty on February 12, 2014 to "two
counts of using the mail to execute an immigration services fraud scheme," and sentencing is
scheduled for April 29, 2014.54
2. Yi Quan Chen
Yi Quan Chen left China in April 1995, seeking refuge from officials who wanted to
punish him and his wife for conceiving a child in violation of China's family planning laws.5 5
He paid smugglers to help him flee to the United States. 56 He thought he was also paying
them for bona fide legal representation.57
Immigration authorities detained Mr. Chen immediately upon his arrival in the
United States.58 Trusting the immigration "assistant" who visited him in detention, Mr. Chen
signed an asylum application in English, a language he did not understand.59 Instead of
explaining why he fled China, however, the application gave an entirely different reason for
his claim.60 Consequently, because Mr. Chen's written application conflicted with his
51. See Alison Gene Smith, Hearing Scheduled for Woman Accused of Swindling Immigrants, TIMES-Ni.ws (Oct.
16, 2013), http://www.magicvalley.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/hearing-scheduled-for-woman-accused-of-fraud
(explaining that in 2011 a state court judge issued a default judgment against Perez for $103,500, which included $85,000
in restitution for six of Perez's victims, and that according to an Idaho Attorney General's Office spokeswoman,
"[Perez] never responded and we never collected any money.").
52. Jerome Woman Indicted for Mail Fraud, TI U.S. AYrORNEY'S OFFICE FOR T1IE DisT. OF IDAIO, U.S. DFP'T
OF JusTICE (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/usao/id/news/2013/oct/perezl0112013.html [hereinafter Jerome
Woman Indicted for Mail Fraud]; John Sowell, Defendant Pleads Not Guilty in Immigration Scam, IDAI o STATESMAN
(Oct. 16, 2013), http://www.idahostatesman.com/2013/10/16/281 8853/defendant-pleads-not-guilty-in-fraud.
53. Jerome Woman Indicted for Mail Fraud, supra note 52.
54. Smith, supra note 51; Jerome Woman Admits Using U.S. Mail in Immigration Fraud Scheme, THE U.S.
A rrORNEY'S OFFICE FOR -n, DisT. Or lIoAIIo, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/usaolid/
news/2014/feb/perez02122014.html.
55. Chen v. INS, 266 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2001).
56. Id.
57. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Chen v. INS, No. 00-70478 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2001).
58. Chen, 266 F.3d at 1097.
59. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 57, at 4.
60. Chen, 266 F.3d at 1097.
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courtroom testimony, the immigration judge (IJ) made an adverse credibility finding and
ordered him deported.61
Once Mr. Chen returned to China, government officials arrested and severely beat
him.62 After escaping detention in China, Mr. Chen fled to the United States for the second
time.63 Immigration authorities again apprehended him, and he remained in custody for
several years while he fought deportation.6 Mr. Chen filed a new asylum application based
on his real reason for seeking asylum. However, an IJ again ruled against him on a finding of
adverse credibility due to inconsistencies between his new application and the 1995
application, which had been filed on his behalf by the immigrant consultant. 65 The IJ ordered
him deported, and the BIA affirmed the ruling.6 6
The University of Idaho Legal Aid Clinic, appointed by the Ninth Circuit pro bono
program, discovered that Mr. Chen was one of many victims of immigration fraud involving
attorney Robert E. Porges, a Harvard Law School graduate, and his Chinese-born wife,
Sherry Lu Porges, immigration "assistants" engaged in UPIL and immigrant smugglers. 67
The criminal prosecution against them revealed that they had constructed stock asylum
applications based on claims they fabricated. Porges and his assistants would file one of the
fictitious applications for clients such as Mr. Chen, and Porges or one of his employees would
then appear in court on behalf of the client. 68 Porges, his wife, and twelve of their employees
were convicted in 2002 of several charges, including racketeering, immigration fraud, alien
smuggling, and tax evasion, and sentenced to eight years in prison. 69 The government
estimated that between 1993 and 2000 Porges made profits of more than $13.5 million from
defrauding his clients.70 After sentencing, Porges's lawyer argued that his client had been
unfairly singled out and that he was "going to jail for conduct which is conducted every day
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1098.
64. Author Monica Schurtman served as the attorney of record for Mr. Chen during appellate review and recalls
the difficulties she faced in working to get Mr. Chen released from detention, even after he prevailed at the Ninth
Circuit.
65. Chen, 266 F.3d at 1098.
66. Id.
67. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 57, at 7; Susan Sachs, Law Firm Charged in Aiding Smugglers of
Chinese to U.S., N.Y. TIMLs (Sept. 21, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/21/nyregion/law-firm-charged-in-aiding-
smugglers-of-chinese-to-us.html.
68. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 57; Mark Hamblett, Government Outlines Case Against Porges,
N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.porges.net/FamilyTreesBiographies/RobertPorges.html.
69. Benjamin Weiser, Couple Sentenced for Roles in Immigrant Smuggling Ring, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2002), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2002/08/10/nyregion/couple-sentenced-for-roles-in-immigrant-smuggling-ring.html. The judge also
ordered Porges to forfeit to the government six million dollars, which prosecutors said were proceedings from the
enterprise's activities. Id.
70. See Matt Hayes, Corrupt Lawyers Aid Immigration Woes, Fox Niws (Apr. 29, 2002), http://www.foxnews
.com/story/2002/04/29/corrupt-lawyers-aid-immigration-woes/.
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by people in this business.""' Mr. Chen received no compensation for the years he spent in
immigration detention nor for the considerable sum he had spent for Porges's fraudulent
services, but, unlike many of Porges's victims, he did eventually obtain asylum.
C. Systematic Harm Caused by UPIL
In addition to wreaking havoc in the lives of immigrants and their families, practition-
ers of UPIL cause systemic harm by compromising the rule of law. They mock and manipu-
late government functions. Their improper conduct and the obstacles their victims face in
trying to repair the damage foster distrust of the law.72 The limited recourse available to
victims of notario fraud creates the perception by immigrant communities that they simply
cannot obtain justice in the United States.
Confidence in the legal profession is undermined when notarios hold themselves out
as lawyers or work in concert with attorneys to defraud immigrants. Furthermore, UPIL
fosters public distrust of immigrants themselves. In the wake of the Porges prosecution, for
example, advocates saw increased cynicism about the legitimacy of Chinese asylum cases.73
As one observer noted, "[B]oilerplate asylum claims put forth by shady practitioners make it
hard to win legitimate cases." 7 4
UPIL causes additional systemic harm by burdening USCIS, IJs, and the federal
courts of appeal. Specifically, "[i]ncomplete, unwarranted, unnecessary, or inaccurate peti-
tions and applications filed by [notarios] burden the administrative and judicial docket[,]
increasing administrative costs and delaying the processing" of legitimately filed cases.75
Judges and government officials spend time trying to sort out what to do with cases that have
been tainted by notario malfeasance. For example, the Porges firm's immigration fraud
71. Id. Several months after Porges, his wife, and twelve of their "immigration assistants" were convicted, attorney
Joseph Muto was disbarred for acting as an appearance attorney for an "immigration agency," a group of non-lawyers
who filed applications on behalf of Chinese immigrants. Id. According to many observers, such practices are common in
Chinese immigrant communities. Id.
72. Commenting on the conviction of Idaho notario Crystal Tijerina, ICE-HSI special agent Leigh Winchell made
exactly this point, observing that "fraud schemes like this not only victimize the most vulnerable in our society, they also
potentially undermine the integrity of our legal immigration system." Idaho Woman Sentenced for Mail Fraud, Misuse
of U.S. Government Seals, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMs ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DuEi, or HOMELAND SEc. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://
www.ice.gov/news/releases/ 1110/111013boise.htm. People not only relied on Tijerina's false assertions that she knew the
immigration system and was authorized to practice immigration law, she deceived them into believing that they had
obtained the right to live and work in the United States. See Jackson, supra note 43 (discussing the plight of Tiburcio
Bedolla after becoming a victim of immigration fraud).
73. See Hamblett, supra note 68 ("[Tihere will be more cynicism about Chinese [asylum] cases.").
74. Elizabeth Amon, The Snakehead Lawyers, NAT'i L. J. (Sept. 15, 2013), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
900005531170&slreturn=20130815151954.
75. CATH-OUC CHARIfIES PHTHON, supra note 9, at 10.
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caused the government to conduct a special review of an estimated 7,000 asylum cases
nationwide.76
Finally, immigration consultant fraud raises due process questions about whether an
alien's right to a full and fair hearing has been compromised. More specifically, would a
negative outcome in an immigration case have been positive absent notario involvement? In
his dissent in Angeles Castro v. Gonzalez, Ninth Circuit Judge Harry J. Pregerson eloquently
articulated both the individual and the systemic harms that UPIL causes:
We are a country that believes in fairness. We are a country that
believes in the rule of law. We believe that those who are called into
our courts deserve the aid of a counselor who will advocate for the
client vigorously and with professionalism. And yet the system we
have in place makes a mockery of these things we claim to hold dear.
Not only does it deprive a vulnerable group of people of competent
representation, it does so in a context in which people believe they
are receiving competent representation. We tolerate the inevitable
result of proceedings like this: that families are broken up, and that
United States citizen children are discarded from this country be-
cause their parents could not afford better representation. Removing
a person from the United States-a person who has set down roots,
who has become part of our community, who has children and family
here-should be a grave act attended with the utmost caution. To re-
move a person whose only guides have been notarios and appear-
ance attorneys is to secure a cheap victory at the cost of fairness. . .
Because prejudice is inherent in this notario system, I would grant
the petition solely on the basis of egregious violations of Petitioners'
constitutional right to due process.77
II. REMEDIES TO "UNDO" HARM DONE BY NOTARIOS
A. Immigration Law Remedies
Notario fraud sometimes results in the denial of an otherwise meritorious immigra-
tion claim. Immigration remedies for victims are limited, even for people who may have
had-or currently have-a strong immigration case but for the fraud. Not only do few reme-
dies exist, they characteristically involve complex procedures, formidable burdens of proof,
and an understanding of how to persuade and negotiate with government officials. Absent
76. Hayes, supra note 70.
77. Angeles Castro v. Gonzalez, 176 F. App'x 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2006).
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competent counsel, obtaining immigration relief based on notario fraud is usually impossible,
especially if a court has issued a removal order.
This section of the article addresses three mechanisms that have the potential to rem-
edy an individual's immigration case: motions to re-open, fraud waivers, and U visas.78 No-
tably, not only are these processes limited as a matter of law and practice, every one of them
is discretionary. They also require payment of additional filing fees, sometimes amounting to
thousands of dollars, beyond what the victim has already paid. Because these fees are non-
refundable, if remedial efforts fail, victims lose even more money than what they have al-
ready wasted because of notario fraud.
Despite these obstacles, pursuing one or more of these approaches may prove worth-
while in certain cases. If nothing else, a sympathetic government official presented with com-
pelling facts might agree to a review of the merits of the underlying immigration claim. And,
as a matter of broader advocacy, the more frequently judges, USCIS adjudicators, and gov-
ernment attorneys are presented with the realities of notario fraud, the more willing they
may become to exercise favorable discretion.
1. Motions to Re-open Removal Orders
A successful motion to re-open results in de novo consideration of a claim for
immigration relief. Most courts analyze motions to re-open UPIL cases under Fifth
Amendment due process standards or principles of basic fairness and equity.79 In Avagyan v.
78. USCIS may adjudicate requests to re-open in limited circumstances. See 8 C.F.R. §103.5(a)(2) (2013) (describ-
ing requirements for motions to re-open). For an excellent "nuts-and-bolts" discussion of filing requests to re-open with
USCIS, see AYUDA & Tmin CMTY. JusTICE PRoJeCr, NoTARIO FRAUD REMiE-Dns: A PRAcncAL MANUAL FOR IMMI-
GRATION PRACflTIONERs 60-62 (2013) [hereinafter NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES]. Victims of notario fraud may also ask
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to exercise prosecutorial discretion. In the immigration context,
"prosecutorial discretion includes decisions about whether or not to arrest, detain, and charge non-citizens with immi-
gration violations, to proceed with removal proceedings ... to execute final orders of removal, and to re-open proceed-
ings in order to permit a non-citizen to seek immigration status." Anna Marie Gallagher, Prosecutorial Discretion in the
Immigration Context, 12-11 IMMI;R. BRIEFINGs 2 (Nov. 2012). Individuals deciding whether or not to file a request for
prosecutorial discretion should exercise particular caution and explore the potential pros and cons with a competent
immigration attorney. See NOTARIo FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 26-37 (describing prosecutorial discretion
possibilities for victims of notario fraud), Appendix Sec. IIB(1) (providing a sample request for prosecutorial discretion
based on notario fraud).
79. The stronger safeguards of the Sixth Amendment do not apply in immigration cases, which are civil, rather
than criminal, in nature. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1014, 1017-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Sixth
Amendment rights in criminal versus civil immigration proceedings). Accordingly, there is no Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel in immigration proceedings. Id. However, courts have recognized that immigrants have an important
liberty interest in not being deported, which triggers the Fifth Amendment right to due process. See id at 1017
(discussing Fifth Amendment rights in immigration proceedings). Under this theory, grossly ineffective assistance of
counsel constitutes a denial of due process. Id. Additionally, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 confers on immigrants in removal cases a
statutory right to counsel at no expense to the government. Id. Consequently, the Fifth Amendment should give non-
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Holder, the Ninth Circuit explained that "[i]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation
proceeding is a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment if the proceeding was so
fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case."80
Some notarios work in tandem with "appearance attorneys."81 In such instances, the notario
serves as a conduit to the attorney, often recruiting clients and engaging in authorized
practice of law; meanwhile, the attorney may have met the client briefly, if at all, before
appearing in court for a hearing on the merits of the client's immigration claim. 82 Because an
attorney is involved in the fraud, ineffective assistance of counsel and Fifth Amendment due
process rights are implicated.83
The BIA and appellate courts typically frame cases involving motions to re-open for
"notario-only" fraud in terms of fairness and equity rather than directly under the Fifth
Amendment, because the conduct of an actual attorney is not at issue. Accordingly,
consideration of motions based on "notario-only" fraud is rooted in an immigrant's reliance
on the deception, fraud, or error of notarios holding themselves out as lawyers.84
Regardless of which analytical construct is applied, significant and complex
procedural and substantive law challenges make winning a motion to re-open based on UPIL
an uphill battle. Motions to re-open are generally disfavored and are therefore granted
sparingly.85 Immigrants face additional hurdles, such as compliance with the requirements of
Matter of Lozada,86 as well as the exhaustion of administrative remedies, due diligence,
establishing prejudice, time-consuming processes and backlogs.
citizens who retain an attorney a due process right to effective assistance of counsel. See id. (citing Lopez v. INS, 775
F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985)).
80. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ray v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 2010)
(providing the same); Maravilla Maravilla v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 855, 857-58 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing the same); Lopez
v. INS, 775 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1985) (providing the same); Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 198-199 (5th Cir. 1975)
(discussing fundamental fairness).
81. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 675 (explaining that Avagyan retained a notario who said that an attorney
would represent her for $2000 and that Avagyan first met the attorney at her removal hearing, where the attorney did
not ask her any questions about her case); Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing
how Morales Apolinar's attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel).
83. See Aliza B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 62
RUTGERS L. Rtv. 345, 349 (2010) (discussing Fifth Amendment Due Process issues that arise in ineffective assistance of
counsel motions to re-open removal orders).
84. See, e.g., Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (granting petitioner's motion to re-open
because he relied on the false statements, misconduct, and erroneous advice of a notario claiming to be an attorney).
85. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 315 (1992) ("Motions for re-opening immigration proceedings are
disfavored for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing ad motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence.").
86. See Matter of Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (BIA 1988) (specifying the requirements for motions to re-
open).
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a. Compliance with Lozada and Other Prerequisites
Individuals who seek to re-open a removal case based on notario wrongdoing in
which an attorney was involved must first comply with requirements established by the BIA
in Matter of Lozada.87 Lozada affirmed previous rulings that, although respondents in depor-
tation proceedings may have a Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, they
must take certain actions before filing a motion to re-open based on deficient representa-
tion.88 The BIA held that compliance with the Lozada rules is important to: (1) reassure the
agency that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is legitimate and (2) increase its ability
to monitor lawyers representing individuals in proceedings. 89
Lozada has three requirements. First, individuals who seek to re-open based on al-
leged ineffective assistance of counsel must submit an affidavit detailing the agreement with
counsel about the actions to be taken in the immigration case, any representations or
promises that counsel made about the case, and whether counsel explored all avenues of
relief available to the alien.90 Second, they must notify counsel of the specific allegations of
ineffective assistance and provide counsel the opportunity to respond.91 Finally, they must
file a complaint with an appropriate disciplinary authority, such as the BIA or the attorney's
state bar, explaining why they believe that the lawyer violated reasonable or ethical legal
standards.9 2 After the respondent satisfies the Lozada requirements, the agency may con-
87. See id. (specifying the requirements for motions to re-open).
88. See id. at 638 (explaining what a non-citizen must show to demonstrate denial of due process in an immigration
proceeding due to ineffective assistance of counsel). The George W. Bush Administration called these principles into
question when Attorney General Michael Mukasey held that respondents in removal proceedings have no constitution-
ally protected right to counsel and therefore no right to file a motion to re-open based on alleged ineffective assistance
of counsel. In re Compean, 24 1. & N. Dec. 710, 726 (BIA 2009) [hereinafter Compean 1]. Compean I effectively over-
turned decades of precedent that guaranteed Fifth Amendment due process to individuals in removal proceedings. See
id. at 712 (noting the implications of the decision on precedent). Several months later, Eric Holder, Attorney General
under the Obama Administration, withdrew Mukasey's order and directed the BIA and immigration judges to continue
to apply Lozada, pending the results of a rulemaking process regarding ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See In re
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA 2009) [hereinafter Compean II] ("[T]his Order vacates Compean in its entirety....
[T]he Board and Immigration Judges should apply the pre-Compean standards to all pending and future motions to re-
open based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.").
89. Matter of Lozada, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 639-40.
90. Id. at 639.
91. Id.
92. Id. Alternatively, movants may explain why they did not file such a complaint. See id. (providing that if a
complaint has not been filed with the proper disciplinary authorities the movant should specify why not). One reason
might be that the attorney admitted his or her failure to provide effective assistance of counsel. The Ninth and Second
Circuits have maintained a flexible approach to meeting the Lozada requirements. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 676
n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that although petitioners must generally comply with Lozada, failure to do so "is not necessa-
rily fatal to a motion to re-open"); Yang v. Gonzalez, 478 F.3d 133,143 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that the Lozada require-
ments "are not sacrosanct if the facts are plain on the administrative record"). The other circuits' approaches to Lozada
vary. See generally Kaplan, supra note 83, at 351 ("Courts . . . differ in their willingness to re-open claims based on
ineffective assistance of counsel especially when the alien does not meet all three Lozada factors.").
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sider whether the attorney's alleged malfeasance violated the due process guarantees of the
Fifth Amendment.93
Failure to file a Lozada complaint is generally less problematic if the basis of a mo-
tion to re-open is "notario-only" fraud. 94 The touchstone here is fairness. Movants must
demonstrate that the notario's deception, fraud, or error actually or constructively precluded
them from undertaking actions necessary to their immigration cases, thereby depriving them
of a fair hearing and causing injury.
b. Exhaustion of Remedies
Whichever kind of notario fraud is involved, an immigrant must exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing a motion to re-open. This means that movants must
first file the motion with either immigration court or the BIA, depending on the procedural
posture of the case and when they discovered the fraud or ineffective assistance of counsel. If
they learned of it after an IJ entered a removal order but before the BIA assumed jurisdic-
tion over the case (or if the movant did not file an appeal to the BIA), they must file a
motion to re-open with immigration court. If they discovered the misconduct after the BIA
affirmed an IJ's removal order, they must file the motion with the BIA.
The exhaustion requirement is complicated by the deadlines imposed on motions to
re-open, which are ninety days after an administrative decision and removal order is entered
or 180 days in the case of an in-absentia order.95 Unfortunately, people usually do not be-
come aware of the notario fraud until after the deadlines have past. Given the slipshod na-
ture of notario practice, notarios may not even notify their clients of the outcomes until long
after the re-opening time has passed.
c. Due Diligence and Equitable Tolling
When a motion to re-open is filed after the expiration of the ordinary time limit, new
hurdles arise. In such case, establishing a prima facie case for a violation of due process or
93. See Mohammed v. Gonzalez, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Although there is no Sixth Amendment right
to counsel in a deportation proceeding the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment still must be afforded to an
alien petitioner."); Kaplan, supra note 83, at 375-376 (discussing Mohammed v. Gonzales).
94. Although filing a Lozada complaint is not required in cases which do not involve an attorney, aggrieved
individuals should still strongly consider filing a complaint with the FTC, BIA, USCIS, a state consumer fraud division,
bar, notary licensing agency, or a similar entity. First, filing a formal complaint will strengthen the motion to re-open.
Second, complaints to the appropriate state and federal agencies may assist them in identifying individuals and organiza-
tions who engage in a pattern and practice of fraudulent immigration representation, and thereby enhance broader
efforts to combat notario fraud. See supra notes 85-86 for a discussion of the challenges of filing a complaint.
95. See INA § 240(c)(7)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C) (providing the deadline for motions to re-open).
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fundamental fairness due to notario fraud is not sufficient to persuade the agency to re-open
a removal proceeding. The movant must also persuade the agency to equitably toll the time
limit. 9 6 Equitable tolling rests on a movant's ability to demonstrate to the agency's satisfac-
tion that she exercised due diligence in discovering the fraud, deception, or error caused by
the ineffective assistance of counsel or notario and attempted to remedy it.97
d. Establishing Prejudice
The next challenge in a motion to re-open for ineffective assistance of counsel or
notario fraud is to prove that that the representation "was so inadequate that it may have
affected the outcome of the proceedings."98 In other words, movants must demonstrate that
the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that they were prevented from reasonably
presenting their case. 99 Movants must therefore not only show grossly inadequate represen-
tation, they must also establish that they would likely have had an immigration remedy avail-
able but for the incompetence or fraud.100
e. Time-Consuming Process and Immigration Court Backlogs
The final obstacle an immigrant may face in ultimately prevailing on a motion to re-
open based on notario fraud relates to the exhaustion doctrine.' 0 If an IJ denies a motion to
re-open for notario fraud, the respondent may appeal to the BIA by filing a notice of appeal
within thirty days of the denial. 102 The BIA can either affirm the IJ's denial, reverse the
decision, or remand for further proceedings. If the BIA denies a motion to re-open in the
first instance or affirms the denial of an IJ's decision, the movant can file a petition for
review with the federal court of appeals where the case arose. Even if notario victims can
persuade an appellate court that the agency erred in denying their motions to re-open, the
exhaustion doctrine usually requires the court to remand the case to the agency for addi-
96. See, e.g., Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining and applying the equitable
tolling principle). Currently, most circuits have found that the INA's deadlines for re-opening are non-jurisdictional
claim processing rules subject to equitable tolling and that therefore motions to re-open after the prescribed time limits
may be considered in certain instances, including situations of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and notario fraud.
See, e.g., Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 717 F.3d 847, 851 (11th Cir. 2013); Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 490-
91 (7th Cir. 2005); Borges v. Gonzalez, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 2005); lavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2000).
97. See Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 825-27 (holding that the BIA failed to properly assess due diligence in
denying the petitioner's motion to re-open for notario fraud and remanding the case for further consideration).
98. Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F. 3d 889, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2003).
99. Ray v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)).
100. See NOTARio FRAUD REMiDIES, supra note 78, at 64-66 (providing suggestions on how to document
prejudice).
101. See supra notes 78 -84 and accompanying text.
102. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.38(b) (explaining deadlines for appealing the decision of an immigration judge to the BIA).
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tional action consistent with the court's decision. Consequently, even with a court victory,
notario victims may have to wait years for a final resolution of their immigration claims.
2. Section 212(i) Fraud Waiver
Not surprisingly, UPIL victims who do not have removal orders entered against them
face fewer hurdles in trying to regularize their immigration status. Nevertheless, obstacles
exist. These victims may be eligible or subsequently become eligible for permanent
residence-but for the fraud committed by the notario.
These situations arise, for example, when an individual qualifies for permanent
residence, but the government imputes to the applicant the fraud committed by a notario in a
previously filed application.103 In such cases, the government may charge that the applicant is
inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), which states that "any alien who, by fraud or
willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has
procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit
provided under [the Immigration and Nationality Act] is inadmissible." 104
In situations where a notario included fraudulent information in previously filed
paperwork, the applicant can challenge fraud allegations by arguing a lack of knowledge and
intent to commit fraud. If an applicant decides not to pursue such a challenge or the
challenge fails, advocates should explore whether the applicant qualifies for a discretionary
fraud waiver under INA § 212(i) ("212(i) waiver").105 Absent such a waiver, a non-citizen
typically cannot adjust status. 106
103. University of Idaho Immigration Clinic participants recently spoke with an individual referred to here as
"A.B." A.B., who has resided in the United States for more than 30 years, relied on a notario decades ago to file a claim
for permanent residence. The notario filed an application that contained apparently fraudulent facts even though A.B.
may have actually had a valid claim for permanent residence. A.B. was devastated when he discovered that USCIS
denied his application and subsequently revoked his work authorization. His adult daughter, who recently naturalized,
now wants to file an immediate relative petition for him so that he can apply for permanent residence. The information
in the original application may require him to return to his country of origin to apply for admission as a legal permanent
resident. Such departure would likely trigger the unlawful presence bar, and he would be prohibited from reentering the
United States for ten years. Additionally, the false information contained in A.B.'s original application may render him
inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(7). Although a discretionary hardship waiver exists for this kind of fraud, it is not clear
that A.B. will meet its requirements. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (describing the discretionary hardship waiver).
Notario fraud, although performed many years ago, may now prevent A.B. from becoming a permanent resident and
result in his eventual removal.
104. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
105. INA § 212(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) (describing discretionary waiver for extreme hardship).
106. See, e.g., Jun Min Zhang v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that an alien who has
engaged in immigration fraud cannot adjust status absent a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(i)).
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Section 212(i) authorizes an immigration judge or a USCIS adjudicator, as an
exercise of discretion, to waive a finding of fraud or misrepresentation under INA
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(1). The section 212(i) statute states, in pertinent part, that such a waiver may
be granted
in the case of an immigrant who is the spouse, [adult] son, or [adult]
daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if it is established to the satisfaction of the
[judge or adjudicator] that the refusal of admission to the United
States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the
citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.
107
In effect, section 212(i) is limited to applicants for permanent residence who can show that
their removal from or inadmissibility to the United States would cause extreme hardship to
their U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouse or parent. Under the plain language of
the statute, extreme hardship to other family members, including minor children, will not be
considered.
An applicant for a waiver must establish extreme hardship to the qualifying relative if
the qualifying relative remains in the United States without the applicant and if the qualify-
ing relative accompanies the applicant to the applicant's home country. 08 The phrase "ex-
treme hardship" is not defined by statute,109 and whether or not extreme hardship exists is
determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the totality of the circumstances. 10
The Supreme Court has held that the term, although flexible, may be construed narrowly.'
In Perez v. INS, for example, the Ninth Circuit stated that "'extreme hardship' is hardship
that is 'unusual or beyond that which would be normally expected' upon deportation."112
That court found, for example, that uprooting family and separation from friends and com-
munity does not necessarily amount to extreme hardship "but represents the type of incon-
venience and hardship experienced by the families of most aliens being deported."' 1 3
107. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)(1) (emphasis added).
108. See In re Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 1. & N. Dec. 560, 567 (BIA 1999) (considering what is required to show
"extreme hardship").
109. See id. at 565 (noting that the phrase "extreme hardship" does not have a fixed meaning).
110. See id. ("Extreme hardship is not a definable term of fixed and inflexible meaning, and the elements to estab-
lish extreme hardship are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case."); Matter of Chumpitazi, 16 1. & N.
Dec. 629, 635 (BIA 1978) (providing the same); Matter of Kim, 15 1. & N. Dec. 88, 89 (BIA 1974) (providing the
same); Matter of Sangster, 11 1. & N. Dec. 309, 313 (BIA 1965) (providing the same).
111. See INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139,145 (1981) ("The Attorney General and his delegates have the author-
ity to construe 'extreme hardship' narrowly should they deem it wise to do so.").
112. Perez v. INS, 96 F.3d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1996).
113. Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The BIA and federal courts have come to a general consensus that factors relevant to
determining extreme hardship include: (1) the qualifying relative's family and community
ties in the United States and in the applicant's home country; (2) the financial impact on the
qualifying relative if the applicant cannot reside in the United States; (3) whether or not the
qualifying relative has health problems that require treatment in the United States or for
which suitable treatment in the applicant's home country is unavailable; (4) the strength and
kind of relationship the qualifying relative has with the applicant, including the emotional
impact on the qualifying relative if separated from the applicant; (5) the age of the qualifying
relative; (6) whether or not the qualifying relative depends on the applicant for assistance in
caring for children or parents; (7) economic, political, and social conditions in the country to
which the qualifying relative would have to relocate; or (8) other circumstances that would
cause undue hardship to the qualifying relative.114
These factors are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and a proper determination
should rest on whether "the combination of hardships takes the case beyond those hardships
ordinarily associated with deportation."s15 Accordingly, in a case of notario fraud, an adjudi-
cator should take into account hardships directly related to the fraud. Depending on the
particular circumstances, an extreme hardship assessment might include the emotional im-
pact on qualifying relatives who believed, to their detriment, that a notario's assurances that
the contents of the application filed were true or the economic consequences for a qualifying
relative of the applicant's removal as well as the money paid to the notario for a useless
application and the expenses involved in trying to rectify the problems.
3. U-Visas
The U visa, for which victims of certain crimes may qualify, offers another potential
immigration remedy for notario fraud.116 The results of U visa petitions based on notario
offenses are decidedly mixed. During the last half of 2013, however, anecdotal evidence
suggests that USCIS may be more willing to approve U visas rooted in UPIL-related
conduct.117
114. See id. (discussing factors considered in making an extreme hardship determination); Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S.
at 144-46 (discussing the same); Palmer v. INS, 4 F.3d 482, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing the same); Hernandez-
Cordero v. INS, 819 F.2d 558, 562-64 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the same); Matter of L-O-G-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 413, 416-
20 (BIA 1996) (discussing the same); Matter of O-J-O-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 381, 382-84 (BIA 1996) (discussing the
same); Matter of Ige, 20 1. & N. Dec. 880, 882-83 (BIA 1994) (discussing the same); Matter of Anderson, 16 1. & N. Dec.
596, 597-98 (BIA 1978) (discussing the same).
115. Matter of 0-J-0-, 21 1. & N. Dec. at 383.
116. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U), 212(d)(14), 214(p), 245(m); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U), 1182(d)(14), 1184(p), 1255(m);
8 C.F.R. § 214.14. In certain situations a victim's parents, guardian, next of friends, and unmarried siblings under age 18
may also qualify for relief under the U statute. INA § 101(a)(15)(U)(i)-(ii); 8 U.S.C. §§ 101(a)(15)(U)(i)-(ii). Limited
categories of "indirect" victims may also be eligible. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14).
117. National Immigration Project List Serve Postings (June 6, 2013-Dec. 18, 2013) (on file with authors).
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Law enforcement and humanitarian purposes motivated Congress to enact the U visa
statute. First, it is intended to encourage undocumented victims to report crime without fear
of deportation and to cooperate with law enforcement officials in the investigation and
prosecution of alleged perpetrators. Second, the statute seeks to afford victims protection
and assistance."18 To help meet these objectives, the statute permits certain victims of the
following twenty-six qualifying crimes to petition for a U visa:
[Riape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault,
abusive sexual contact, prostitution, sexual exploitation, female geni-
tal mutilation, hostage taking, peonage, involuntary servitude, slave
trade, kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment, blackmail, extor-
tion, manslaughter, murder, felonious assault, witness tampering, ob-
struction of justice, perjury, attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to
commit any of the above-listed crimes, or any similar activity in vio-
lation of federal, state or local criminal law.119
U visa beneficiaries are authorized to remain in the United States temporarily and to
apply for employment authorization. In certain circumstances, the individual may qualify for
lawful permanent residence after three years in U status.12 0
Petitioners for a U visa must demonstrate that they (1) have suffered substantial
physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of one or more of the twenty-six
qualifying criminal activities; (2) possess credible and reliable information establishing
knowledge of the facts of the qualifying crime upon which the visa petition is based; (3) have
been helpful, are being helpful, or are likely to be helpful to a certifying federal, state, or
local agency in the investigation or prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity; and (4)
have been a victim of the qualifying criminal activity in the United States or of a federal
offense that provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction. 12 1
118. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1513, 114 Stat. 1464
(2000) (describing the purpose of providing protection to crime victims); U.S. CrnzINs!I!Iw & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
U.S. DEPi,'T OF HOMELAND) SEC., USCIS Puiuisims NEw RULE FORt NONIMMIGRANT VicrIMs OF CRIMINAL. Acnvrry
(Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/U-visaO05SeptO7.pdf ("Many
immigrant crime victims fear coming forward to assist law enforcement because they may not have legal status....
We're confident that we have developed a rule that meets the spirit of the Act; to help curtail criminal activity, protect
victims, and encourage them to fully participate in proceedings that will aid in bringing perpetrators to justice.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
119. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U). The term "any similar activity" refers to criminal offenses
in which the nature and elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal
activities.
120. INA § 245(m); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (in).
121. INA §§ 101(a)(15)(U)(i); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(U)(i). Because our discussion of U visas focuses on thresh-
old eligibility hurdles that notario victims face, we have not included guidance about the actual filing of a U visa petition
and supporting evidence. For a comprehensive treatment of the practicalities involved in such a filing, see NOTARIO
FRAU) REMEDIEs, supra note 78, at 44-56, Appendix IIB(1)-(7).
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a. The Challenges that Notario Victims Face in Qualifying for a U-Visa
In general, victims of notario fraud can meet three of the above four criteria required
for securing a U visa. The frequency with which successful investigation or prosecution of
immigration scammers is based on information and assistance provided by their victims dem-
onstrates that many victims both possess credible, reliable, and detailed information about
the crime, and that they are willing to cooperate with law enforcement. Also, notario fraud
typically, though not always, occurs in the United States. The main hurdle that notario vic-
tims face in obtaining U visas is establishing that they were victims of qualifying criminal
activity and that they suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been
victimized.
i. Establishing Qualifying Criminal Activity
"Fraud" alone is not a qualifying crime for purposes of the U statute. Notario fraud,
however, sometimes includes conduct that comes within the ambit of several of the crimes
enumerated in U statute. Extortion, blackmail, perjury, and obstruction of justice constitute
common qualifying crimes suffered by victims of notario fraud. 122 Other qualifying criminal
behavior, such as assault, may occur in the context of notario fraud, especially when victims
confront perpetrators.
Regulatory guidance supports such an approach in defining the qualifying criminal
activity. The Federal Register states that for the purposes of U eligibility, "[q]ualifying crimi-
nal activity may occur during the commission of non-qualifying criminal activity. For varying
reasons, the perpetrator may not be charged or prosecuted for the qualifying criminal activ-
ity, but instead, for the non-qualifying criminal activity." 1 2 3 Consequently, framing the quali-
fying crime turns on the original qualifying criminal activity investigated or prosecuted rather
than the ultimate offense of conviction. This approach extends to civil actions; the key ques-
tion is whether an underlying crime was committed, even if the cause of action is civil. Immi-
gration attorney James A. Benzoni explains this concept by pointing to the RICO statute,
which is "a civil action based on underlying criminal conduct (predicate crimes). The crimes
need not have been charged, only committed." 1 24 Accordingly, in preparing U visa petitions,
advocates should strive to frame notario fraud as a qualifying crime enumerated in the U
statute.
122. See NorARIo FRAuD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 41-42.
123. New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for "U" Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg.
53,014, 53,018 (Sept. 17, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a, and 299).
124. National Immigration Project List Serve Posting (Oct. 19, 2012) (on file with authors).
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ii. Establishing Substantial Physical or Mental Harm as a Result of a Qualifying
Crime
For purposes of U visa eligibility, "[p]hysical or mental abuse means injury or harm
to the victim's physical person, or harm to or impairment of the emotional or psychological
soundness of the victim" as a result of the qualifying crime.125 In determining whether abuse
is substantial, a number of factors are considered, individually and cumulatively, including
but not limited to:
The nature of the injury inflicted or suffered; the severity of the per-
petrator's conduct; the severity of the harm suffered; the duration of
the infliction of the harm; and the extent to which there is permanent
or serious harm to the appearance, health, or physical or mental
soundness of the victim, including aggravation of pre-existing
conditions. 126
The harms suffered by notario fraud victims typically affect their mental health and
soundness. They can be severe, serious, and permanent, particularly when the result is re-
moval or inability to lawfully reside in the United States.12 7 As the Supreme Court has stated
on several occasions, deportation may deprive a person "of all that makes life worth
living."1 28
For many victims, uncertainty about their future and afraid of separation from family
members carries with it extreme depression and anxiety. In the case of asylum applicants
who fled egregious physical harm, threat of removal exacerbates existing mental health
problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder. In some cases, the shock, shame, and self-
recrimination for having blindly relied on a fraudster adds to this psychological unmooring.
Further, the financial ruin frequently caused by notario fraud may result in further psycho-
logical damage. Finally, violence and threats of violence by notarios against victims causes
emotional harm and in some cases, physical harm.129
125. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(8).
126. Id. § 214.14(b)(1).
127. See supra Part I.
128. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Similarly, the Court declared in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (1948), that "deportation is a drastic measure, and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile."
129. See NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIEs, supra note 78, at 44-46 (discussing how to prove substantial harm); COHEN,
supra note 34, at 39-40 (discussing the same).
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iii. Obstruction of Justice and Perjury as Qualifying Crimes
The "U" regulations specifically address harm suffered because of obstruction of jus-
tice and perjury, stating in relevant part, that U visa petitioners may be considered qualifying
victims if they have been:
Directly and proximately harmed by the perpetrator of . .. the ob-
struction of justice or perjury; and . . . there are reasonable grounds
to conclude that the perpetrator committed the . . . obstruction of
justice or perjury at least in principal part, as a means . . . to further
the perpetrator's abuse or exploitation of or undue control over the
petitioner through the manipulation of the legal system.13 0
Some fraud victims suffer substantial harm as a result of a notario's perjury and ob-
struction of justice. It is not uncommon for notarios to commit obstruction of justice, perjury,
or analogous offenses to further their control over victims through misuse of the legal sys-
tem. 31 For example, in a recent Idaho case, a notario used U.S. government seals to deceive
immigrants into believing she was authorized to provide immigration assistance.13 2 In an-
nouncing the judgment against the notario, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agent who investigated and helped
prosecute her characterized her actions as undermining the integrity of the legal system.133
b. Recommendations
The U visa statute supports relief for certain victims of notario fraud, despite the fact
that fraud is not specifically enumerated as a qualifying crime. Several strategies could maxi-
mize the possibility that notario fraud victims may secure U visas. Advocates need to explain
to law enforcement officials the importance of investigating and prosecuting a qualifying
crime related to notario fraud or to characterize the crime as such in the law enforcement
certifications required by statute. Similarly, advocates should explain to USCIS adjudicators
that notario fraud may relate to a qualifying crime.
Ideally, Congress should amend the U visa statute to explicitly include notario fraud
as a qualifying crime. In the absence of a statutory amendment, USCIS should issue official
guidance making clear that the U statute should, in appropriate circumstances, be inter-
130. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14)(ii).
131. See supra Part I.C (discussing systemic harm caused by UPIL).
132. Idaho Woman Sentenced for Mail Fraud, Misuse of U.S. Government Seals, supra note 72.
133. Id.
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preted to include notario fraud. Such an approach would be consistent with the agency's
emphasis on reducing notario fraud.
B. Monetary Relief for Victims
Some notarios are deliberate fraudsters who alight in a community, bilk people, and
then move on to another community. Other times, lay people slip into UPIL in a misguided
attempt to help immigrants. Their apparent good-heartedness does not obviate the extreme
harm that they can do, and they should not have to be told more than once that they have
strayed from their legitimate endeavors.134 Many notarios fall in a middle ground, running
multi-service business enterprises that handle travel arrangements, divorce papers, taxes, and
immigration work. 135 Some or much of the immigration work they do may cross the line into
UPIL, often with disastrous results. These notarios are often well established in the commu-
nity, owning both businesses and personal property, but they are often reckless in their
promises and forays into legal territory. The following discussion of remedies will refer back
to these three UPIL scenarios-the "fraudster notario," the "strayer," and the "business
notario"-and identify the mechanisms best suited to each UPIL situation.136
A discussion of these mechanisms begins with a list of the likely monetary harms
suffered by the victim. Most obviously, the victim has lost the fees paid to the notario for
non-existent or improperly handled services. Additionally, the notario's errors or mishan-
dling of documents may proximately cause the victim to incur legal fees to repair the legal
harm done or simply alleviate victims' uncertainty over their immigration status.137 Also, if
the notario's errors caused a delay in obtaining status, the victim has lost the monetary gains
that come with legal status, usually in the form of better employment opportunities.
Remedies law requires certainty. Lost employment opportunities may be too specula-
tive to be recoverable, but in an unusual case the victim may be able to produce evidence of
134. The first time the person missteps may not be deliberate, but harm to the public good has still occurred.
Certainly if, after admonition, the individual persists in engaging in UPIL, his or her "good-heartedness" is called into
question and that person becomes more like a business notario.
135. Those businesses may be engaged in other forms of unauthorized practice of law, if they dabble in, for exam-
ple, divorce law. They may misstate what the law is to their customers and potentially encourage their clients to engage
in fraud, especially in the tax area. See, e.g., Complaint at 4-5, Vargas v. Casa Latina, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1568 (D.N.Ga.
May 4, 2012) [hereinafter Complaint, Vargas v. Casa Latina]; SAMUEL C. ROCK, AMER. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS'N, THE
INTERSEC-ION OF INCOME TAX AND IMMIGRATION LAW WITH A BRIEF DISCussION ON TAX BENEFITS FOR HAITIAN
TPS RECIPIENTS 797, 802 (2010).
136. These categories of notario are being made for the purpose of matching the best remedy to the situation, as
opposed to the "gatekeeper" or "stand alone" categories. The gatekeeper type of notario referenced above could fall
into either the fraudster or the notario business category. See supra note 4 (describing gatekeeper-type notarios).
137. For a successful example of this recovery, which includes a thoughtful analysis by the court, see Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 842 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
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a contract or solid offer that could not be fulfilled because of the lack of proper immigration
documentation. Additional monetary harm may be proven, for instance, if an individual had
to sell his or her home because of deportation and sold it at a loss. Normally, the victim has
suffered emotional harm, including prolonged stress, shock at the betrayal by the notario,
uncertainty about how to proceed, worry, fear of separation from loved ones, and so forth. In
sum, notarios' errors can cause immense financial and emotional damage. As happens so
often in the law, the more cataclysmic the harm, the more difficult damages may be to prove.
Remediation of harm is possible through various mechanisms. Restitution may be
available from governmental prosecution of the notario under federal or state statutes
prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices, or state penal codes. Alternatively, the victim may
sue in a private action under state Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practice (UDAP) laws or
state common law, including traditional restitution and small claims. These remedial mecha-
nisms may be combined, as long as the recovery is not duplicative. Collections are a chal-
lenge, but various practical suggestions have emerged from recent successful cases against
notarios.138
1. Victim Compensation Through Governmental Prosecutions of Notarios
a. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices139
The federal government and all states have consumer protection acts that prohibit
unfair or deceptive practices.140 Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC
Act") prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."141 An "un-
fair" practice is defined as one that "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consum-
ers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."142
Notario fraudsters easily fall within this prohibition, and business notarios usually do
as well. The consumers are substantially injured, as described above. The consumers have
sometimes only recently arrived in the United States and are non-lawyers, not fluent in En-
glish, and not accustomed to our legal system. As such, they usually cannot see through the
138. Not all footnoted cases arise in the UPIL context. Effort has been made to find apposite or analogous factual
contexts, where possible. Cases are cited for general propositions of law and concentrate on Idaho, Washington and
Texas.
139. To get an overview of UDAP law, see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, UNFAIR AND DECEFIlVE Acrs
AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter UNFAIR AND DECEPTIvEL Acrs AND PRACflCES].
140. See Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). State acts are sometimes called
"little FTC Acts." See MARY DE PRIDGEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION & THEI! LAw § 2:10 (2006). Others have names
reflecting their concern with Deceptive Trade Practices, Consumer Protection, or Fair Business Practices.
141. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
142. Id.
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misrepresentations of scurrilous notarios and lack an understanding of the intricacies of im-
migration law. Notarios often misrepresent that they have authorization to provide immigra-
tion and naturalization services, that fees paid cover all costs associated with submitting
documents to USCIS, that customers can obtain immigration documents not actually availa-
ble to them, or even that the notario's "immigration service" is affiliated with the United
States government.143
The Federal Trade Commission prosecutes violations of the FTC Act in U.S. district
court. In addition to seeking civil or criminal penalties and cease and desist orders, the FTC
usually requests "monetary equitable relief" 1" in the form of consumer refunds or redress.
The refunds are essentially intended to be restitutionary and to prevent defendants from
profiting from their wrongdoing; they are viewed as equitable disgorgement1 45 and are
neither full compensatory nor punitive damages. 14 6 When the FTC sues, the victim can get a
refund of the moneys paid to the notario, but the statute does not contemplate compensation
for other consequential financial, emotional, or physical harm. 14 7
All states have UDAP laws. 148 Prohibitions relevant to notario fraud include: "caus-
ing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or associa-
tion with, or certification by, another;"14 9 representing that a person has a status, connection,
qualifications or license that he does not have; representing that services are of a particular
standard, quality or grade when in fact they are not; representing that services are needed if
they are not; providing services that are not needed; and "[e]ngaging in any act or practice
143. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 7-12, F.T.C. v. Immigration Ctr., No. 311-
CV-00055 (D. Nev. Jan. 31, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint Against Immigration Ctr.].
144. FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Administrative adjudication is an alternative procedural route through
which the FTC seeks cease and desist orders. FTC Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). After such order is granted, the FTC
may go to district court and seek redress for consumer injury caused by the conduct at issue in the administrative
proceeding. FTC Act § 17b, 15 U.S.C. § 57b.
145. The nomenclature for the types of equitable monetary relief available under the FTC Act differs to some
extent from traditional restitution described in the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. See infra
notes 171, 205-08 and accompanying text. The FTC distinguishes between restitution (repayment to victims in the
amount that they paid to the defrauder, which essentially amounts to a rescission of the fraudulent contract) and dis-
gorgement (paid to the U.S. Treasury and measured as gross profits less allowable costs). See FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp.,
87 F.3d 466, 468-470 (11th Cir. 1996) (interpreting FTC Act § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)). Another source of consumer
redress is Section 19(b) of the FTC Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 57b (discussing civil actions). Disgorgement is discussed at
greater length in Part IV.
146. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining the character of such monetary damages).
147. CONSUMER PRoFIciON LAw DEVELOPMENTs 278 (August Horvath & John Villafranco, eds., 2010) ("The
major purpose of the FTC Act is to protect consumers from economic injury .... ).
148. Federal discussion on the FTC Act informs interpretation of state UDAP law, and vice versa. See Amback v.
French, 173 P.3d 941, 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) ("[Tlhe [Washington] legislature expressed its intent that Washington
courts should be guided by federal decisions and orders of the federal trade commission when construing the CPA.").
149. See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE. ANN. § 48-603(3) (2013); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(3) (2007). Thirty-
eight states use this phrasing.
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that is otherwise misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer."150 The essence of the proof
is not the mens rea of the service provider-his intent to defraud-nor any actual damage to
the public; rather, the question is whether the practice "possesses a tendency or capacity to
deceive consumers."'1 5 A few states expressly proscribe "any unconscionable method, act or
practice in the conduct of any trade or commerce."I 5 2 This includes behavior where an indi-
vidual "knowingly or with reason to know, took advantage of a consumer reasonably unable
to protect his interest because of . . . ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the lan-
guage, . . . or similar factor."153 Other state legislatures leave the prohibition general by
providing, for example, "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade of commerce are hereby declared unlawful." 54 Such
general language leaves further refinement to enforcement agencies and courts.155
Deceptive trade acts do not fail because of a consumer's contributory negligence in
failing to realize that the tradesperson is a fraud,'56 nor must the government prove that
victims suffered actual harm from the notarios' deceptive trade practices. The harm is in the
deception.157
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-603(17).
151. State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122 (Idaho 1980). The state of Washington has a
"public interest" requirement, meaning that a private dispute does not rise to the level of a UDAP violation. But, as
previously discussed, notario fraud has implications beyond those of the single victim and the notario. In Washington, a
pattern or practice with real and substantial potential for repetition would be actionable, especially when many consum-
ers are affected by even one instance of deception. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables Inc. v. Safeco Title Vin. Co.,
719 P.2d 531, 537-538 (Wash. 1986) (describing the "inducement-damage-repetition" test and factors relevant to estab-
lishing public interest). Washington has its own statutory protection against notarios. See WASii. REV. CoDE.
§ 19.154.060 (2011).
152. See IDA1HO CoiDE ANN. § 48-603(18) (using such language); Micei. CoMr. LAws §§ 256.687, 256.695 (2013)
(describing unconscionable practices or acts).
153. See, e.g., IoAno Couw ANN. § 48-603C(2)(a) (using such language).
154. See WASH. REV. Coos: § 19.86.020 (using such language).
155. Smith v. Stockdale, 271 P.3d 917, 922 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the meaning of the terms "unfair and
deceptive"). Compare State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc., 143 P.3d 618, 629-30 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to prosecute
purveyors of natural medicine since no finding of a deceptive practice), with Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 675
P.2d 193, 197 (Wash. 1983) (upholding prosecution of title agent for UPL). The court in State v. Pac. Health Ctr., Inc.
concluded, "A party practicing law or medicine without a license does not deceive the public if they do not claim to be
licensed and are, in fact, competent or skilled in doing what they represent they can do. Someone who practices law or
medicine without a license is not necessarily incompetent to perform the service that constitutes the practice of law or
medicine. Under Bowers, the issue is whether that person in fact misrepresented his or her level of competence." 143
P.3d at 629-630.
156. The Supreme Court has written, "There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with
whom he transacts business. Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of busi-
ness has long since decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor
should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception." FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937).
157. Notarios in Texas attempted to argue that because an alleged victim obtained her citizenship, their violation of
state UDAP, "if any, [was] not serious." Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 637 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). This evidence was
properly excluded, and the proper inquiry is the gravity of the act, not the gravity of the harm done by engaging in the
act. Id. at 637-38; see also State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 122-23 (Idaho 1980) (discussing
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Monetary relief for victims is contemplated under state consumer protection laws.'5 8
State attorneys general may recover, on behalf of wronged consumers, amounts needed to
restore the victims. The primary measure of these amounts is the fees paid for the notario's
services.159
Victims need not testify or be named in the government's complaint to recover resti-
tution.160 For instance, Thomas v. State illustrates the breadth and flexibility of the govern-
ment's remedies in the notario context.161 The State of Texas, acting through the Consumer
Protection Division of the Attorney General's Office, sued Ruth and John Thomas, who
conducted business as Tramites Migratorios.162 After presenting "abundant evidence"16 3 that
the defendants violated the Notary Public Act and the state UDAP Act, the state used de-
fendants' own receipt booksM to prove that each defendant had "acquired $469,416.50 by
means of an unlawful act or practice."165 Restitution to consumers was allowed even though
the state had not specified the persons entitled to the restitution nor how much each identi-
fied person should be paid.166 Allocation of the money among consumers was left to "the
sole discretion" of the Texas Attorney General's office.167 The appellate court allowed resti-
tution for amounts dating back further than the two-year statute of limitations; the court
held that the two-year limitation expressly attached only to "actual damages," distinguishing
unfair and deceptive acts); State v. Kaiser, 254 P.3d 850, 858 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing what the State must
prove in a Consumer Protection Act suit).
158. IDAHO Coon ANN. § 48-606(1)(c) (noting possibility of monetary relief); WASI. REV. CODE § 19.86.080 (dis-
cussing possibility of monetary relief),
159. See, e.g., IDAHO CoDiE ANN. § 48-606(1)(c). States can also recover their own attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Molano
v. State, 262 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining recovery of attorneys' fees).
160. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 125 (Idaho 1980) (discussing who may
recover restitution); State v. Ralph Williams' N. W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 439 (Wash. 1976) ("The
restitution applies to all aggrieved consumers. It is not limited to the consumers who testified at trial.").
161. Thomas v. State, 226 S.W.3d 697 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (dealing with remedies for violations of the Notary
Public Act and Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
162. Id. at 700.
163. Id. at 704.
164. See id. at 705 (discussing of hearsay and business records evidence rules in this context).
165. Id. at 704.
166. Some states with differently worded statutes have reached contrary results, whereas some other jurisdictions
are in accord and have found that this does not violate defendants' constitutional rights. See State ex rel. Reno v.
Barquet, 358 So.2d 230, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that the State Attorney may not obtain damages on
behalf of the State under Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Law); State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 510 P.2d 233 (Wash. 1973) (discussing the issue in the context of used car sales).
167. Thomas, 226 S.W.3d at 707. In Idaho, the district court may establish the allocation of money to consumers.
See State ex rel. Kidwell v. Master Distribs., Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho 1980) (giving that the district court may
establish allocation of money to consumers); Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d at 438 (discussing
appropriate procedures for allocation of money).
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"restitution" as an equitable remedy.168 These rulings were sustained even though the matter
was not brought as a class action because it was "a de facto class action." 6 9
UDAP laws also provide more indirect benefits to victims through assessment of civil
penalties.17 0 These penalties are paid to the state, and their primary purpose is punishment
and prevention. Sometimes, however, the state diverts the money in a way that addresses
victims' harm, or at least the sufferings of people similarly situated to the victims. For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts a false advertising case against a mattress company was settled by re-
quiring the company to provide $100,000 worth of bedding for local homeless shelters. 71
This approach could be applied in a UPIL scenario. The government, for instance, could use
monies fraudulently received to pay for educational efforts to caution recent immigrants
away from notarios.
A different approach was taken in an unfair condominium sale in California. Al-
though "no cognizable direct victim" was identified, the court mandated the seller to be
disgorged of money illegally acquired and deposited in a "fluid" recovery fund that could
ultimately be used to benefit people similarly situated to plaintiffs.172 Careen Shannon
thought along these same lines in her article calling for a statute governing UPIL. As part of
a multi-faceted plan, she suggested that some of the funds collected in civil damages and paid
to the state be put into a trust for funding immigration legal services around the state. Her
plan goes beyond helping the victims of notario fraud in that it would prevent notarios from
getting a foothold by diverting their clientele to legitimate providers. 7 3
b. Restitution for State Crimes
State prosecutors may charge notarios with crimes, as discussed later in this article.
Criminal prosecution opens the door for victims to recover lost money by using reparation or
restitution statues in effect in many states. These statutes "allow and facilitate the monetary
168. Thomas, 226 S.W.3d at 705-10; accord Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 646 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that
2,181 consumers had paid at least $150 to the defendant notarios).
169. Thomas, 226 S.W.3d at 710; see also Molano v. State, 262 S.W.3d 554, 560-61 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing
de facto class actions).
170. See discussion infra Part IV (examining civil penalties).
171. UNFAIR AND DEcEFIvrE Ac-s AND PRACrlCES, supra note 139, § 15.5.4.3 (citing a news release of the Massa-
chusetts Office of Attorney General from Dec 9, 1992).
172. People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 41 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), abrogated by Kraus
v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485, 507-08 (Cal. 2000); see also Stan Karas, The Role of Fluid Recovery in
Consumer Protection Litigation: Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 959, 970-71 (2002) (discussing
the concept of fluid recovery).
173. See Careen Shannon, To License Or Not To License? A Look at Differing Approaches to Policing the Activities
of Nonlawyer Immigration Service Providers, 33 CAmozo L. REv. 437, 483 (2011) [hereinafter To License Or Not To
License] (describing the need to establish a trust fund to finance the provision of free immigration legal services).
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compensation of crime victims."' 74 In addition to criminal penalties, some states punish
crimes of fraud by requiring that the perpetrator pay the victim treble the victim's actual loss.
For instance, a fraudulent investment counselor in Arizona was ordered to pay his victims
three times their actual loss, for a total of $1.6 million. 75 Such case law, though not within
the notario context, could guide recovery for victims in a notario prosecution.
2. Private Actions by Victims
a. UDAP
The federal FTC Act does not allow for private actions, 7 6 but victims have the right
to sue in every state under state UDAP laws.'7 7 Victims of all types of UPIL178 should seek
"out of pocket" costs, primarily the amounts paid to the notario,179 and proximately-caused
consequential damages, including lost jobs, time,180 and additional legal fees.' 8 Wages lost by
taking time away from work to deal with the legal tangles created by notarios may also be
recoverable.182 In some states, elderly or disabled people bringing actions may recover en-
hanced damages. 83
Damages for mental anguish or emotional distress should be allowed as well, 184 un-
less the state UDAP statute excludes them. Some UDAP statutes require business or prop-
174. George Blum, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Crimi-
nal Statute, 15 A.L.R. 5th 391, 432. The use of the word "restitution" in the Restatement differs somewhat from its use in
this context, as here the word more describes compensatory damages paid to undo at least some of the harm caused by a
crime. See, e.g., WAsH. Riev. CODE § 9.94A.753 (2003) (discussing restitution).
175. See State v. Henderson, 717 P.2d 933, 934-35 (Ariz. Ct. App.1986) (holding that, in order to secure a more
favorable plea agreement in a state RICO action, defendant could consent to forfeiture of some property not the fruit of
the illegal activity).
176. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
177. See, e.g., IDAHO Cooi) ANN. § 48-608 (2008) (providing for actions to recover damages); Tix. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50 (2005) (providing relief for consumers); WASH. Riiv. CODE § 19.86.090 (2009) (providing civil action
for damages).
178. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting the three types of UPIL situations).
179. UNFAIR AND DECEflVEIM AcES AND PRACICES, supra note 139, § 13.3.
180. See Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 204 P.3d 885, 899 (Wash. 2009) (holding that plaintiff's time away from
his business was sufficient injury, as was an adverse effect on credit rating resulting in a loss of business profits).
181. See id. at 902 (explaining that measurement of legal fees must carefully distinguish among (1) resolution of the
underlying immigration matter; (2) untangling of the mess created by the notario; and (3) fees incurred to bring the
UDAP case).
182. See id. at 900-03 (discussing losses and expenses that may be recoverable).
183. In Idaho, for example, the enhancement is the greater of $15,000 or treble the actual damages, upon proof of
certain losses enumerated in the statute, including "loss of assets essential to the health or welfare of the elderly or
disabled person." IDAHO Con ANN. § 48-608(2).
184. See TiEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (providing express allowance for mental anguish damages);
Barnette v. Brook Road, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 741, 751 (E.D. Va. 2006) ("Compensatory damages are those allowed as a
recompense for loss or injury actually received and include loss occurring to property, necessary expenses, insult, pain,
mental suffering, injury to the reputation, and the like.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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erty injury, as opposed to general injury.'85 In those states, recovery for pure emotional harm
may not be allowed. However, proof of minimal, temporary or intangible economic injury
will sometimes provide a sufficient platform to support recovery for emotional distress. 186
If proof of actual damage is lacking, plaintiffs should check their respective state's
UDAP statutes: about half of the states allow private litigants to recover minimum statutory
damages in amounts ranging from $25 to $10,000.18 These are neither punitive damages nor
penalties paid to the state. Rather, designed to overcome proof issues and to encourage
private litigation, these damages are a substitute188 for actual damages that do not meet the
minimum amount, even in cases with no showing of actual injury.189 They may be aggregated
for multiple violations or tripled as a punitive measure.
Attorneys' fees for the costs of bringing the UDAP claim are normally recoverable to
make prosecution of the claims economically feasible'90 and to encourage private enforce-
ment.191 Punitive damages are possible in most states, often in the form of treble damages
upon proof of intent, bad faith, or simply as a matter of the court's discretion.192 While puni-
tive damages are intended primarily to punish, deter, and prevent future bad acts, the fact
that these damages are paid to plaintiffs suggests that there is a compensatory aspect to them
as well.
185. See, e.g., WASH. Rev. Coon, § 19.86.090 (requiring there must be injury to "business or property," not solely
personal injuries); Panag, 204 P.3d at 899 ("Personal injuries, as opposed to injuries to 'business or property' are not
compensable and do not satisfy the injury requirement.").
186. See Panag, 204 P.3d at 899-902 (allowing recovery of pecuniary loss occasioned by inconvenience, id at 899, as
well as money for postage, parking, and consulting an attorney). Note that the Panag court distinguished damages from
injury and stated that unquantifiable damages would suffice. Id. at 900. In the case of a notario's victim, the lower status
of being without long-term, secure documentation may result in lower wages and a smaller range of possible jobs.
187. UNFAIR AND DECEI-lVE Acos AND PRAcTiCEs, supra note 139, §§ 13.4.1 et seq.
188. See, e.g., Tri-West Constr. Co. v. Hernandez, 607 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (permitting actual dam-
ages for one UDAP violation and statutory minimum damages for another).
189. See, e.g., loAHo CoDE ANN. § 48-608(1) (allowing a consumer to recover actual damages or a minimum of
$1000); White v. Mock, 104 P.3d 356, 364 (Idaho 2004) (discussing recovery under IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-608(l)). Note
that in Washington a consumer may recover actual damages only. WASH. Rav. CODE § 19.86.090.
190. See, e.g., Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 679 (Tenn. 2005) ("The potential award of attorneys' fees
under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act is intended to make prosecution of such claims economically viable to
plaintiff.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
191. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 587 S.E.2d 581, 584 (Va. 2003) ("The fee shifting provisions of
the VCPA are designed to encourage private enforcement of the provisions of the statute.").
192. See IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 48-608 (authorizing treble the actual damages for an elderly or disabled person
bringing suit); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §17.50(h) (authorizing up to treble the actual damages); WASH. Ray.
CODE § 19.86.090 (authorizing treble of actual damages up to $25,000).
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All of these rules should be applied liberally, with an eye to avoidance of deceptive
practices and restoration of the victim to his or her rightful position. The law in this area is
quite helpful for consumers and may serve as a starting place for victim's advocates.1 93
b. State Common Law
Victims can bring common law causes of action against notarios for fraud, fraudulent
concealment, conversion, deceit, forgery, breach of fiduciary duty, and even simple breach of
contract.1 94 It is usually more difficult to prevail on a common law fraud claim than a statu-
tory UDAP claim, as a plaintiff has more to prove.1 95 Further, the fraud defendant may push
back by citing the victim's negligence, unreasonable reliance, or lack of due diligence. On the
other hand, "where the person making the statement has inhibited plaintiff's inquires by ...
creating a false sense of security," the failure to inquire into facts that could be made availa-
ble to the plaintiff is not fatal.1 9 6 In the notario context, the modus operandi is to create a
false sense of security. The notario presents himself as the one with knowledge of the Ameri-
can language, culture, and legal system. Therefore, the reasonableness of plaintiff's conduct
should be a question of fact for the jury.
Some notarios may also be liable for attorney or notary malpractice.' 97 The negli-
gence per se doctrine might help establish breach of tort duty when the notario has violated a
statute that, for example, prohibits unauthorized practice of law. Standard recovery would
include out-of-pocket expenses, consequential damages, and likely punitive damages. This
remedy applies to all of the notario scenarios but is particularly useful against the strayer.
193. State and federal civil RICO should also be considered as a means of recovery against both fraudsters and the
business notario. See, e.g., Complaint, Vargas v. Casa Latina, supra note 135, at 10-13 (outlining alleged state and federal
RICO violations by defendants). Discussion of these actions, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
194. These are generally state claims and should be brought in state court. See De Pacheco v. Martinez, 515 F.
Supp. 2d 773, 783 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (denying federal question jurisdiction to several of these types of tortious claims).
195. The court in Miller v. William ChevroletlGeo, Inc., 762 N.E.2d 1, 11-12 (111. App. Ct. 2001), engages in an
interesting discussion of common law fraud and statutory UDAP. The reliance element of fraud is largely eliminated in
UDAP, and the plaintiff's diligence is not required. Id. at 12-13. Also, the intent to deceive required in fraud becomes
merely the intent that statements be relied upon in UDAP. Id. at 12.
196. Carter v. Mueller, 457 N.E.2d 1335, 1340 (111. App. Ct. 1983).
197. Other states take the opposite tack, holding that a non-attorney may not be liable for legal malpractice. See
UNFAIR AND DECEPFivF Ac-rS AND PRACIlCES, supra note 139, §10.4.2.5; Sande L. Buhai, Act Like a Lawyer, Be
Judged Like a Lawyer: The Standard of Care for the Unlicensed Practice of Law, 2007 U FiAH L. RiEv. 87, 97 (2007) ("A
majority [of jurisdictions] hold that when an unauthorized law practice is conducted by a layman, he is held, at a mini-
mum, to the standards of competency of a lawyer. Failure to conform to that standard constitutes actionable
negligence.").
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c. Small Claims Court
For those who are damaged in an amount less than the statutory maximum for the
jurisdictional court system, small claims court may be an excellent option because the rules
of evidence are relaxed and no attorneys are required. 198 In a recent case from Wisconsin, a
notario's advice led to the deportation of the plaintiff's wife. 199 The plaintiff sued in small
claims court for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, breach of an implied duty of good
faith, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, UDAP violations, notary misconduct, and
negligent provision of services. 200 The small claims judge granted summary judgment for the
defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff had no standing and that his wife "was here
illegally by her own choice," thereby making the contract in question "unenforceable." 201
The appellate court reversed, explaining that the plaintiff did have standing because
he had a personal stake in the outcome and had incurred legal and travel expenses.202 The
Wisconsin court did not expressly refute the assertion that the contract was unenforceable,
but other courts have not viewed such arguments as dispositive. 203 Although this Wisconsin
plaintiff was represented by a lawyer who was willing to take the case through appeal, per-
haps some victims could begin to use the small claims courts pro se if these actions could gain
some traction.
198. EvEYN Ciuz & KATHY BRADY, IMMIGRANT LEGAL Ris. CTR., How To SUE AN IMMIGRATION CONSULT-
ANT IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT 6-7 (2001).




202. Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court hinted at the plaintiff's likely emotional harm and
expressly noted his expenditures to keep his family together, including both legal fees and travel expenses to take his
children to be with his wife in Mexico. Id. at 2. Defendants appealed, decrying the opening of the floodgates of litigation;
their appeal was summarily denied. Enciso-Lopez, 806 N.W.2d at 639; see also Georgia Pabst, "Notarios" Ask for Su-
preme Court Review, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL ONLINE (July 11, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/
125382578.html (discussing the case).
203. See, e.g., Gamboa v. Alvarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1016-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (characterizing a scheme for fake
immigration papers as increasingly criminal). When plaintiffs realized that they had been scammed, they sued in state
court for common law fraud, unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and viola-
tion of the Illinois UDAP act. Id. at 1015. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs had entered into an illegal contract,
violated the law and public policy, and that the parties were in pari delicto. Id. at 1017-18. Dismissal on those grounds
was reversed, because (1) the plaintiffs were seeking to get back money for being misled and (2) the plaintiffs were not
in pari-equally-bad as defendants: "plaintiffs spoke little English, did not know defendants were lying/unable to
deliver on their promise and would not necessarily know the agreement was illegal." Id.
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d. Traditional Restitution
UPIL committed by the established business notario204 is ripe for another civil ap-
proach, the oft-forgotten theory of restitution for unjust enrichment. 205 Restitution operates
on the simple concept that "a person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong." 206 The acts
and deceptions of notarios are wrong. Fraud is "one of the principal grounds for restitution
and one of the principal sources of unjust enrichment." 2 0 7 A victim of fraud is entitled to
disgorge the perpetrator of the proceeds of the fraud; that is, the money paid over by the
victim. Accordingly, the "restitutionary" remedy is congruent with the standard common law
remedy of "out of pocket loss," but providing proof may be easier, especially in a suit against
an established business that keeps records. If a victim or a group of victims has insufficient
paperwork to prove how much the notario's UPIL has cost them but can prove the amount
gained by the notario, that amount should be returned to the victims. 20 8
Restitution shines in measures like the constructive trust. In such cases, the victim
may be able to recover more than he lost and get some preferences in bankruptcy. When
notarios are well established in the community, with traceable personal and business as-
sets,209 plaintiffs should be able to make good use of this remedy. Consider this illustration
from the Restatement commentary:
Victim loses $100,000 to Embezzler. After discovering the fraud, Vic-
tim is able to establish that embezzler used Victim's money to
purchase Blackacre. Because Blackacre qualifies as Embezzler's
homestead, it would be exempt from execution on a judgment for
damages. Restitution gives Victim ownership of Blackacre, rather
than a judgment to be satisfied from a property of Embezzler. Relief
will usually take the form of a decree that Embezzler holds Black-
acre in constructive trust for Victim.210
The tracing component of restitutionary recovery is not easy 2 1 1 but may be signifi-
cant. For example, if the business notario's UPIL profits provided the money for the notario
204. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (highlighting the typology of notario scenarios).
205. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RFsTIrurION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
206. Id. § 3.
207. Id. § 13 cmt. a.
208. See, e.g., Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 645-47 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing calculation of damages).
209. This remedy works especially well for the business notario. See supra note 115 (describing the "business"
notario).
210. RESTATEMENT, supra note 205, § 13 cmt. h, illus. 25.
211. Examples abound of funds commingled among victims and innocent dealings of the defendant, direct and
indirect transactions, sequential withdrawals and contributions, and so forth. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 205,
§ 59 cmts. c, d.
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to buy real property or assets, 2 12 UPIL victims may be able to disgorge from the notarios the
value of the property or even obtain actual ownership of the property. This approach may be
lucrative if the property has increased in value since its initial purchase. Victims may benefit
from the simplicity of receiving title to the property rather than having to prove its value. 213
The victims' interest may be paramount to other unsecured creditors. 2 14 Multiple claimants
may aggregate their claims and then divide the funds to receive shares in proportion to
contributions. 2 15
Fraud is just one of the relevant wrongs enumerated in the Restatement. Notarios
may also be charged with conversion,216 breach of fiduciary relation,217 and occasionally "un-
due influence." 218 The advantages of restitution are significant and, at times, startling.219 It
should be in every litigator's toolkit.
3. Practicalities
Before the lucre of private civil recovery shines too bright, reality must cast its
shadow. A prerequisite to these legal mechanisms is the victim's willingness to come
forward. Fear of law enforcement and lack of familiarity with our nation's legal system
commonly deter reporting such conduct. In addition, those who do venture forward may be
discouraged by slow processes and the fluidity of the notario's modus operandi. For instance,
a notario may have folded up shop and moved on by the time fraud is discovered, especially
in larger states with fluid immigrant populations. Nonetheless, the possibility of monetary
212. Similarly, if the money were traced to the purchase of stock or any other asset that might appreciate, the same
theories would hold.
213. RESTATEMENT, supra note 205, § 51 cmt. b, illus. 2.
214. Id. § 51 cmt. b, illus. 3; see also id. § 55 cmt. c (describing the policies behind the balancing of interests between
the victims and other creditors).
215. Id. § 59 cmt. f. Also consider this illustration: "Acting wrongfully, X obtains $1000 from A on January 1, $2000
from B on February 1, and $3000 from C on March 1, depositing these funds (and no others) in a single account. The
account is closed on April 1, leaving a balance of $2000. . . . A, B, and C share pro rate to their losses (i) any traceable
product of the April withdrawal and (ii) the $2000 closing balance." Id. § 59, illus. 17.
216. Id. § 40.
217. Id. § 43.
218. Id. § 15. Victims may also be able to cite § 44(c), which provides that "when the object of a legal prohibition of
general application is to protect persons in the position of the claimant, the circumstances of an intentional and profita-
ble violation will sometimes permit the conclusion that the wrongdoer has been unjustly enriched at the claimant's
expense." The illustrations to this comment are not on point, but the wording may permit inclusion of the unauthorized
practice of law and unpermitted provision of immigration services.
219. In addition to the benefits listed in the text, the statutes of limitations may be more generous than for some
other causes of action. Given the confusion over restitutionary claims and the unfolding of the history of restitution, "the
question of limitations may be especially challenging" in this context. See id. § 70 cmt. a. (discussing the question of
limitations). The equitable doctrine of laches may also come into play. Id.
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redress might incentivize victims to report fraud and provide evidence,220 though they should
be made aware of the difficulties of proof and collecting the damages.
The various roads to monetary recovery outlined above may be combined, with a few
obvious limitations. As always, when thinking about remedies, the key is to pause, reflect,
and use common sense.221 Parallel criminal or civil governmental proceedings do not
preclude private actions for damages or restitution. Although victims may not recover
duplicative remedies, strong complaints will set forth a variety of causes of action. 22 2 One
complaint, for example, may allege multiple counts under UDAP, Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Acts ("RICO"), fraud, restitution, and breach of contract. 223 A
plaintiff "is . . . entitled to one award of compensatory damages, one award of exemplary
damages, and one award of attorney's fees." 224
All lawyers know that a judgment, even a monetary judgment, is just a piece of
paper. The judgment must be collected, and there must be assets from which to wring the
cash.2 25 The business notario, well established in the community for years, has traceable
assets. This bespeaks some stability and some sense of being within the system.226 Fraudster
notarios, on the other hand, are essentially criminals. It is not uncommon for a notario to get
wind of an exposure or legal crackdown 227 and go into hiding, relocate, and set up a new
shop shortly thereafter. If the notario is jailed pursuant to a concomitant criminal action, the
220. A further lure to reporting may be injunctions available with lawsuits. See discussion infra Part III.A.
221. Statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees are all conceptually different, and all may be
collected in the same lawsuit. On the other hand, treble damages and punitive damages are usually duplicative. Statutory
damage amounts are substitutes for actual, proven damages, so they should not be collected together for the same harm,
but it is possible to recover statutory damages for one violation and actual damages for another. Plaintiffs may collect
punitive damages on a fraud claim and treble damages on a UDAP claim. Common law fraud does not usually give rise
to an award of attorneys' fees but statutory claims do. See, e.g., Miller v. United Automax, 166 S.W.3d 692, 697-98 (Tenn.
2005) (finding the award of punitive damages duplicative of treble damages but not of attorney fees).
222. Texas gives a statutory nod to multi-pronged approaches. See TEX. Bus. & COM. COE ANN. § 17.43 (1995)
(covering cumulative remedies).
223. See Wildstein v. Tru Motors, Inc., 547 A.2d 340 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (providing that statutory
claims do not abrogate the common law).
224. Wilkins v. Peninsula Motor Cars, Inc., 587 S.E.2d 581, 583 (Va. 2003). Issuance of an injunction is independent
of penalties. See People v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 480-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing the
purpose and imposition of injunctive relief).
225. Lawyers from both the Federal Trade Commission and the Idaho State Attorney General's Office have
commented on the difficulty, in many cases, of being able to collect the full amount of consumer injury from a fraudster
notario. Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, Attorney, Federal Trade Commission (June 15, 2011). If a legitimate
immigration consultant strays or errs in California, collection may be easier still because that state requires posting of a
bond. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 22443.1 (2013).
226. For example, in the small claims action mentioned previously, the plaintiff collected some money (undisclosed
pursuant to agreement) and, more importantly for the public good, defendants changed their signs and business cards to
make clear that they could not provide legal services. Telephone Interview with Mike J. Gonring, Attorney, Quarles &
Brady (June 25, 2012).
227. The authors have been careful to avoid disclosures about pending or potential moves against notarios.
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notario is not making money. Most notarios significant enough to be prosecuted by the
government are fraudsters used to flying over legal lines and savvy about concealing
assets.2 2 8
With this in mind, the FTC usually moves quickly to file for an ex parte temporary
restraining order (TRO). The showing to get the order ex parte requires providing
information about the defendant's tendency to hide assets and destroy documents, as well as
the FTC's track record with fraudsters. The TRO often includes an order to stop deceptive
practices, appoint a receiver, freeze assets, 2 2 9 grant immediate access to business premises,
and, if necessary, secure mailboxes and safety deposit boxes. The receiver, protected by local
or federal law enforcement, promptly invites the FTC into the notario's place of business to
examine all potential evidence. The evidence is immediately copied to prevent spoliation and
to obviate lengthy discovery processes. 230
A state attorney general may be prevented, to some degree, from taking as aggressive
an approach as the FTC. By statute, many state attorneys general must attempt to obtain
"voluntary compliance" before filing the complaint, unless doing so will "substantially and
materially impair" the provision's purposes by causing a delay in instituting legal
proceedings. 23 1 The provision's purposes may be impaired, for example, if the target has
advanced warning and can hide assets or even evade jurisdiction. To mitigate the possibility
of such consequences, these statutes usually have exceptions for situations where the
attorney general finds that the purposes of the law will be substantially and materially
impaired by delay in instituting legal proceedings. Some state attorneys general have it
within their power to move to freeze assets, order preliminary placement into escrow of all
amounts received from consumers, or appoint a receiver to administer a violator's assets.2 32
Two recent victories by the FTC provide insight into the comprehensive and full
frontal attack required to remedy notario fraud. 233 These cases involve the fraudster-type
228. Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, supra note 225. Winter quoted his boss as saying, "We go after people
who step across the line, and we go after people who live across the line." Id. The aim is to prevent fraud.
229. The asset freeze is common in RICO litigation as well.
230. Telephone Interview with Brad Winter, supra note 225.
231. See, e.g., IAHo Cooi, ANN. § 48-606(3) (2001) (using quoted language); Thx. Bus. & COM. Coi ANN.
§ 17.58(b) ("The acceptance of an assurance of voluntary compliance may be conditioned [on restoring] any money or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of [violative] acts or practices.")
232. See, e.g., FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111-13 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the power to freeze
assets); David Jason West & Pydia, Inc. v. State, 212 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing the power to
freeze assets); but see State v. Gartenberg, 488 N.W.2d 496, 499 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (disallowing requirement of loan
brokers to escrow prejudgment monies); Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 647-48 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (finding injunction
to be overly broad).
233. See Gamboa v. Alvarado, 941 N.E.2d 1012, 1017-19 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (holding for plaintiffs and against
purveyor of criminal schemes to obtain immigration status).
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notario, with the least traceable assets of the various notario types.2 34 Nonetheless, the
thorough approach of the FTC is ideal for all types of notario scenarios because it preserves
evidence, documents, and assets, insofar as possible.
For over ten years, Manuel and Lola Alban allegedly engaged in UPIL, represented
that Manuel was a lawyer, took money for services they did not perform, and made mistakes
when they did perform.235 According to the complaint, the couple filed at least 600
immigration applications, over half of which were denied or rejected for failure to include
proper documentation or pay the required processing fee.236 To make matters worse, the
Albans purportedly destroyed files so that consumers with pending appeals were unable to
obtain copies of their applications.237
On June 1, 2011, the FTC obtained an ex parte TRO against the Albans and their
business. 238 The judge issued the TRO ex parte out of fear that the Albans would otherwise
hide assets and destroy documents and evidence. 239 The TRO prevented further UPIL by
prohibiting the Albans from providing immigration services; facilitated prosecution of the
Albans by granting federal agents immediate access to their business premises, and;
facilitated economic recovery by freezing their assets.240 Federal agents, under the
supervision of a monitor,241 entered the Albans' workplace, seized electronic devices and
copied their business and client records, and preserved original documents for return to the
clients.
The FTC obtained a similar TRO to shut down a multi-state fraudulent enterprise. 242
The complaint alleged that while this enterprise did not use the term "notario," it played on
234. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (giving the three notario situations).
235. Complaint for Permanent Injunction or Other Equitable Relief at 4, FTC v. Loma Int'l Bus. Grp., No.1:11-cv-
01483-MJG (N.D. Md. June 1, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint Against Loma Int'l].
236. Id. at 6.
237. Id.
238. Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order With Asset Freeze, Appointment of a Temporary Monitor, Immediate
Access to Business Premises, and Limited Expedited Discovery, and an Order to Show Cause Why a Preliminary
Injunction Should Not Issue at 9, FTC v. Loma Int'l Bus. Grp., No. MJG 11-CV-1483 (N.D. Md. June 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order].
239. The FTC made a Rule 65 showing of the tendency of similarly situated defendants to destroy evidence and
established that these defendants already made suspiciously large withdrawals from bank accounts. See Memorandum
Supporting FTC's Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order Appointing Temporary Receiver, Freezing
Assets, and Granting Other Equitable Relief at 2, 28, FTC v. Immigration Servs., No. 311-cv-00055 (D. Nev. Jan. 26,
2011) [hereinafter FTC Memo]. This is more crucial in immigration cases because immigration service providers often
have in their possession the only original copies of crucial documents. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
240. This includes prohibition on opening safe deposit boxes, commercial mailboxes, storage facilities, or even mail
addressed to them. FTC Memo, supra note 239, at 9.
241. The monitor was appointed in the TRO, essentially as a logistical supervisor.
242. See Immigration Scam Shut Down by FTC, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/
01/immigration.shtm (discussing FTC's efforts).
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the same immigrant desires to obtain legal status. 2 43 Seven individuals doing business under
various names and in corporations, organized under the laws of various states, ran operations
in three different states primarily using the internet, and held themselves out as authorized
and qualified to provide immigration services.244 In reality, however, none of them were
attorneys or accredited representatives. 245 They filed papers without allowing the clients to
see the papers, resulting in errors in form selection and factual accuracy. 246 The individuals
affixed seals and graphics depicting the American bald eagle, the flag of the United States, or
the Statue of Liberty on their materials to trick people into believing that they were affiliated
with the federal government. 247 The URL names for their websites were confusing, including
addresses with the phrases "uscic-ins.us" or "usgovernmenthelpline." 248 Phones were
answered "immigration center," and consumers were transferred to a live person identifying
him or herself as "agent," "immigration officer," or "caseworker. "249 The individuals charged
fees ranging from $200 to $2500.250 Many customers believed that their fees were being paid
to the United States government to process documents.251 Moreover, the individuals used
standard slick business tactics, such as failing to be clear about actual costs, double charging,
and refusing to give refunds.252
The Colorado and Missouri Attorneys General took criminal action against these
individuals, but they simply moved on to Nevada.253 On January 26, 2011, after talking to
many victims of these scams, the FTC stepped in.2 54 The individuals' businesses were shut
down,255 and the State of Nevada simultaneously filed criminal charges. 256 Eventually the
243. See Complaint Against Immigration Ctr., supra note 143, at 6-12 (describing defendants' business practices).
Final judgment was stipulated and a permanent injunction and other equitable relief was entered on Dec. 27, 2011. See
Stipulated Final Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief as to Defendants
Immigration Center, Charles Doucette, and Deborah Stilson at 2, FTC v. Immigration Ctr., No. 3:11-CV-00055-LRH
(D. Nev. Dec. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Stipulated Final Judgment].
244. Complaint Against Immigration Ctr., supra note 143, at 3-7 (listing defendants and describing their business
practices).
245. Id. at 3-6 (providing descriptions of each defendant).
246. See id. at 10 (explaining that defendants often filed papers before consumers could review them).
247. Id. at 9.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 10.
251. Id. at 11 (explaining that defendants charged the same amount for their purported services as the U.S.
government actually charges to process a given form).
252. FTC Memo, supra note 239, at 12.
253. Id. at 2.
254. See Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order With Asset Freeze, Appointment of a Temporary Receiver,
Immediate Access to Business Premises, Limited Expedited Discovery, and an Order to Show Cause a Preliminary
Injunction Should Not Issue at 1, FTC v. Immigration Ctr., No. 3:11-CV-00055-LRH (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2011) [hereinafter
Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order] (detailing the FTC's response).
255. Id. at 5-6.
256. FTC Combats Immigration Services Scams, FED. TRADE COMM'N (June 9, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2011/06/ftc-combats-immigration-services-scams.
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federal matter was settled, 257 resulting in the return of clients' original documents and a
judgment in the millions, suspended upon the surrender of certain assets and compliance
with the settlement order.258
These prosecutions were part of a concerted and collaborative effort among several
federal and state agencies and attorneys general as well as the Better Business Bureau to
combat immigration services scams. Legitimate immigration service providers also joined in
on their efforts. For example, it was Catholic Charities259 who tipped off the FTC about the
Albans.260 This effort outlines the three pillars of fighting notario fraud: enforcement,
education, and collaboration. 261
III. STOPPING SPECIFIC NOTARIos FROM ENGAGING IN IMPROPER PRACTICES
The first part of this article addressed how to help restore victims of UPIL to their
rightful legal and financial positions. But, these restoration attempts are nearly always inade-
quate. It would be better if the victims had not been victims in the first place, and there were
no harms to remedy. The next three parts of this article discuss prevention of UPIL. We
begin narrowly in Part IV by cataloguing attempts to prevent known notarios from repeating
their behavior. Parts V and VI will discuss broader, systemic approaches.
A discussion of prevention should begin with vocabulary. Prevention, deterrence,
and punishment are closely related, but not identical, terms. To prevent something is to keep
it from happening. 262 Whereas "prevention" is a general term, "deterrence" bespeaks a
more psychological approach to prevention. The Latin root is terrere, or "to frighten." Deter-
rence means discouraging and preventing behavior through fear of consequences or unpleas-
antness.263 Punishment relates to deterrence. The linguistic root of punishment is the same as
257. See FTC Action Bans Defendants from Providing Immigration Services, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/immigration.shtm (describing the settlement).
258. See Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 5-6 (setting forth monetary judgments).
259. Catholic Charities was also instrumental in getting legal representation for Enciso-Lopez in his small claims
case against notarios Monteagudo. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. Defendants went so far as to write
the pope in an effort to get Catholic Charities to back off of the case. Telephone Interview with Mike J. Gonring, supra
note 226.
260. See FTC Combats Immigration Services Scams, supra note 256 (discussing the FTC's actions against the
Albans).
261. National Initiative to Combat Immigration Services Scams, U.S. CITIZENSII1P & IMMIGR. SERvs., U.S. DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (June 9, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?
vgnextoid=3a983ffa91570310VgnVCM100000082ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=8a2f6d26dl7df11OVgnVCM1000004718
190aRCRD.
262. The etymology of word speaks to this: prae venire means acting before something comes. WEDs-rEit's NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY OF T-HE ENGLISi LANGUAGE 1960 (2d ed. 1950).
263. Id. at 711.
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for the words "penalty" and "pain." 264 To punish is to correct and discipline by afflicting with
pain, loss, and suffering.265 It is the opposite of rewarding. Black's Law Dictionary distin-
guishes among "deterrent punishment," with the purpose of deterring like-minded others
from committing crimes by making an example of the offender; "preventative punishment,"
which "prevents a repetition of wrongdoing by disabling the offender," and; "retributive
punishment," which is intended "to satisfy the community's retaliatory sense of indignation
that is provoked by injustice." 266 All of these concepts play a role in preventing notarios, or
would-be notarios, from plying their trade.
While acknowledging the deterrent effect of the monetary awards discussed in Part
III, we now look at more direct preventive measures, civil and criminal, taken against identi-
fied, specific notarios. Some of these measures are punitive. Others are exemplary, intended
to deter others besides the defendant. And, still others are preventive, without necessarily
being punitive.
A. Injunctions
An injunction is the most obvious preventive legal action, designed to avert reoccur-
rence of misconduct by people who have been identified as notarios. Federal and state courts
routinely issue orders against provision of unauthorized, illegal, or fraudulent services,
thereby protecting not only the private litigant 267 or the named complainant in government
actions, but also the general public and all future victims. The beauty of injunctions is that
they can both be tailored exactly to the improper practices used by the given notario and
include general prohibitions. This section details the purposes served by injunctions, sets out
some basic best practices for drafting an injunction, and surveys the law of contempt.
264. Id. at 2013.
265. Id. at 743. The first definition of the verb "discipline" is "to teach." Id. The second and third definitions
involve chastisement or suffering, and the fourth invokes control and strict governance. Id.
266. BLACK'S LAW DICflONARY 1247-48 (7th ed. 1999).
267. A few state UDAP statutes preclude private injunctive relief. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-114 (2000);
see also Baptist Health v. Murphy, 373 S.W.3d 269, 288-89 (Ark. 2010) (interpreting ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-113(f));
Family Res. Grp. v. La. Parent Magazine, 818 So. 2d 28, 32-33 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:1407 (2006)). In other states, some procedural wrinkles may arise. See, e.g., WASH. Rev. CODE § 19.86.095 (requir-
ing that plaintiffs requesting a UDAP injunction must serve the state attorney general with a copy of the initial plead-
ing). The circuit courts are currently split on whether private RICO plaintiffs can obtain injunctive relive. Compare
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1082-89 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding no injunctive relief for private
parties under civil RICO), with Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1983) (McMillan, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (arguing that the majority should have decided the question of whether equitable relief is available to
private parties). Government and private parties using federal or state RICO may seek equitable remedies. See, e.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1964(b) (2013) (discussing civil remedies); AGS Capital Corp., Inc. v. Product Action Int'l, LLC, 884 N.E.2d
294, 310-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing claims based on violations of RICO).
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Injunctions may be issued as remedies for most all of the causes of action identified in
this article.268 Unless otherwise noted, the explanations that follow apply to all of the claims
described. 269 Similarly, the ensuing discussion applies to both preliminary injunctions sought
before trial270 and permanent injunctions sought as a remedy after liability has been
established.
Injunctions are used primarily to prevent future harms.271 They may do so by issuing
direct orders to parties or other actors to cease and desist from illegal or unlawful practices.
But, they can and should go one step further, and educate the defendant by detailing and
explaining what practices are illegal and, by omission, what practices are legal. 27 2 The well-
drafted injunction precludes the defendant from future assertions that he "did not know" he
was doing anything wrong.273
Preliminary injunctions can assist in building the case against, and collecting a judg-
ment from, the defendant by ordering an accounting of profits, production of documents,
freezing of funds, keeping of records, and similar measures. 274 Preliminary injunctions can
give a tactical advantage to plaintiffs or prosecutors because, for the injunction to issue, a
court must determine that the party seeking the injunction is likely to succeed on the merits.
The judge's very decision to issue the order is a harbinger of disaster for the defendant,
which may lead to a quicker settlement. Additionally, the preliminary order often cuts off a
significant income stream to the defendants, which may pressure them to proceed with
settlement.
The efficacy of injunctions lies in their flexibility and ability to address exactly what is
needed in the specific case before the court. The trial court has broad discretion to do "com-
268. Injunctions may be teamed with the other preventive and compensatory measures outlined in this article.
269. The phrase "cease and desist order" is commonly used when the government is seeking to enjoin acts prohib-
ited by statute.
270. Preliminary injunctions remain in force only until final judgment. The terms of these orders may be revisited
at the discretion of the trial court.
271. Some injunctions are also reparative, used to help restore plaintiffs to their rightful positions. Injunctions
need not be onerous. The National Consumer Law Center writes, "In theory, judges should enjoin future conduct even
if they are unwilling to order a company to pay for past conduct that was not clearly deceptive." UNFAIR AN) DICEP-
TIVE Acrs AND PRACrICES, supra note 139, §13.6.1. Case law highlights that injunctions should not be punitive, but
rather should be aimed at prevention of reoccurrence of the bad action. See, e.g., Agronic Corp. of Am. v. deBough, 585
P.2d 821, 824 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) ("The purpose of an injunction is not to punish a wrongdoer for past actions but to
protect a party from present or future wrongful acts.").
272. See, e.g., The Fla. Bar v. Fuentes, 190 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1966) (granting an injunction against a notario long
before any anti-notario laws were on the books); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass'n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 448 (Ind.
2005) (granting an injunction against a notario).
273. The injunction demonstrates to the defendant that this court is watching him and has power over him. Even a
scoff-law will squirm and think again before risking disobedience.
274. See generally Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243 (serving as an excellent example of a detailed
injunction).
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plete" justice by the injunction, and the court's equitable powers are especially broad when
the public interest is involved. 275
The main limits on the courts' discretion in issuing injunctions come from centuries of
equitable precedent. 276 The injunction should address only relevant matters, with relevance
limited by the scope of the underlying crimes, torts, or other legal violations that, along with
the facts at hand, make the injunction ripe.277 Also, the injunction must not inflict "undue
hardship" on a defendant. Certainly it will inflict some hardship, or what feels like hardship,
to the defendant deprived of a moneymaking scheme. The question is, what hardship is "un-
due"? Generally, it is improper to prohibit people from running a legitimate business. The
good injunction carves away the illegitimate practice while leaving intact the defendant's
ability to utilize his training and experience. 278 If, for example, a notario ran a true notary
service, a translation service, and a legitimate travel business, the injunction should not touch
those legal endeavors.
The recent injunction in Avila v. State went too far in restraining two Texan notarios.
The injunction restrained the Avilas from destroying written materials related to their busi-
ness; removing funds or property from the jurisdiction; giving advice about immigration;
selecting or preparing immigration forms; soliciting or accepting compensation for providing
immigration or legal services; and holding themselves out as legitimate providers of immigra-
tion services. 279 However, the appellate court deleted from the trial court's order a prohibi-
tion on spending or transferring any money, securities, or property.280 The court explained,
"Rendering the Avilas unable to pay their bills does not further [the purpose of the UDAP
act]. Additionally, some of their money has been earned through legitimate business activi-
275. State v. Shattuck, 747 A.2d 174, 180-81 (Me. 2000).
276. The argument that the injunction should not issue because an adequate remedy at law exists is usually not
successful in the fraud and deceptive practices context. See, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. NOS Commc'ns, Inc., 84
P.3d 1052, 1054 (Nev. 2004) (holding that the district court erred in declining to issue an injunction); Avila v. State, 252
S.W.3d 632, 643 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) ("When it is determined that a statute is being violated, it is within the province of
the district court to restrain it."); State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423,434 (Wash. 1976)
("The decision to grant or deny equitable relief is within the discretion of the trial court.").
277. Mootness is seldom an issue in fraud or UDAP cases because of the obvious ability of the defendant to set up
shop in a new place. See Ralph Williams' N. W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 510 P.2d at 238 ("Mootness exists in the issuance
of injunctions only where events make it absolutely clear the behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.").
Voluntary cessation of activities is weak, at best, as an argument against issuance of an injunction, especially when the
cessation occurs after the commencement of litigation. See id. ("Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not
moot a case because there is still a likelihood of the illegal conduct recurring.").
278. See State ex rel. Stovall v. Martinez, 996 P.2d 371, 375-76 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000) (holding the injunction nar-
rowly tailored to prevent future KCPA violations and the unauthorized practice of law but not so narrow as to disallow
the defendant from continuing to use his training and experience).
279. Avila, 252 S.W.3d at 648.
280. Id. at 648 (modifying the overly broad injunction).
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ties. The Avilas should have access to money made in a manner that does no harm to the
public." 2 81
On the other hand, if an entire business is deceptive, fraudulent, or otherwise illegal,
the courts may prohibit them from operating.282 An alternative tack is to suspend a business
from operating until it complies with the law. 283 Under Washington's anti-notario law, for
example, an immigration service must comply with the code by not falling into any number
of the prohibited practices it sets forth that pertain to offering assistance in immigration
matters.2 84 Yet another approach would require defendants to deliver a copy of the injunc-
tion to any people with whom they enter into business with for the next five years. 285
Most injunctions begin with an umbrella prohibition, a general order to cease and
desist from violation of the statute. More specific provisions are then added because, to be
enforceable, the injunction must be sufficiently specific that the defendant knows what is
allowed and what is not.28 6 Then, additional provisions can require affirmative acts on the
defendant's part.28 7 For example, at least one court has required a seller to include warning
labels on hazardous goods to correct a public perception that the product was safe. 288 By
analogy, if a notario creates a public perception that he provides legitimate services when he
actually does not, he may be ordered to disabuse the public of that understanding. If he
fraudulently creates his reputation, he can be required to dismantle it.
In a case outside but similar to the immigration context, a California man listed his
services in the phone book as "legal aid" and suggested that people consult with him if they
could not afford an attorney. 289 He targeted poor people being evicted from their mobile
homes as potential clients.290 He did not claim to be a lawyer but did say he had an attorney
281. Id.
282. See State v. Shattuck, 747 A.2d 174, 180-81 (Me. 2000) (belligerent and deceptive motel owner); Kugler v.
Haitian Tours, Inc., 293 A.2d 706, 708-09 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1972) ("legal-tourism" to Haiti claimed to include
divorces which were in fact null and void in New Jersey); Lefkowitz v. Therapeutic Hyponosis Inc., 374 N.Y.S.2d 576,
577 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (fraudulent hypnosis business). For a broad preliminary injunction, see Commonwealth ex rel.
Corbett v. Snyder, 977 A.2d 28, 40-50 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2009) (fraudulent mortgage scheme).
283. People v. iMergent, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844, 852 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing a preliminary injunction in
the context of the sale of an assisted marketing plan).
284. See WASH. RiEv. CoDE §19.154.060 (listing prohibited practices in offering assistance in immigration matters).
285. See Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 10 (ordering defendants to provide a copy of the injunction
to a number of individuals for the following five years).
286. Injunctions must not be "vague and indefinite," although they may be "broad and general." See People v.
Custom Craft Carpets, Inc., 206 Cal. Rptr. 12, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (describing the level of specificity required in an
injunction); Kitsap Cnty. v. Kev, Inc., 720 P.2d 818, 823 (Wash. 1986) (discussing the same).
287. See, e.g., Stipulated Final Judgment, supra note 243, at 11-12 (ordering defendants to keep their names, busi-
ness names, and contact information on file with the FTC for twenty years). .
288. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
289. Brockey v. Moore, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 746, 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
290. Id.
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on staff, even though he did not.2 9 1 A court found he practiced law without a license, vio-
lated consumer protection statutes, and acted with fraud, oppression or malice. 2 9 2 The court
issued an injunction, which was upheld on appeal, that prohibited the use of "Legal Ser-
vices," "Legal Aid Services," "legal," and symbols of the scales of justice on his advertis-
ing.293 He was ordered to provide copies of the injunction to any employees of his businesses
and make compliance reports to plaintiffs' counsel.294 The court further ordered him to ad-
vertise the injunction in various newspapers in the communities where he operated, shoulder
the cost of those quarter-page advertisements, and report to plaintiff's counsel the names of
all persons who responded to the advertisements. 295
Contempt is the remedy for the remedy; that is, it is the reparative and punitive
mechanism used when injunctions have been violated.296 Consumer protection statutes may
set their own penalties for violations of injunctions issued in accord with the statute. 297 Viola-
tions of injunctions may also result in forfeiture of a corporate franchise, which would deter
the business notario and strayer in particular. 2 98 When a court finds a defendant in contempt
of a court order, it enforces not only the law but also its own power to make orders. Courts
do not make light of flagrant contumacy. Even the scoff-law fraudster notario may still be
sobered by the power of contempt.
291. Id. at 751-52.
292. Id. at 749.
293. Id. at 754.
294. Id. at 759.
295. Id. at 760. This final provision was added because a former employee testified that the company received 60-
200 calls per day, and the trial court found it possible that "thousands" of victims might be located by the advertise-
ments. Id. Defendant had destroyed business records, so there was no other practical way to determine his victims'
identities. Id.
296. See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 7-610 (2013) (discussing contempt); WASH. REv. CooE § 7.21.030 (discussing
remedial sanctions for contempt of court). There are three types of contempt. The first is compensatory, essentially a
determination of what civil damages were caused by the contempt. These damages are paid to the original plaintiff in a
civil action, the victim who sought the injunction. Second, civil coercive contempt is used to force a defendant to comply
with the court orders. This usually takes the form of fines paid to the state and could potentially include jail time.
Finally, criminal contempt is possible as well, resulting in fines paid to the state, or incarceration. See, e.g., In re Ryan,
823 A.2d 509, 511-12 (D.C. 2003) (finding in criminal contempt a disbarred lawyer who continued to hold herself out as
a lawyer).
297. See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 48-615 (providing for a fine of up to $10,000 per violation and possible civil
penalties); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(e) (providing for a penalty of not more than $10,00 per violation, not
to exceed $50,000); WASH. REV. CoDE § 19.86.140 (authorizing a penalty of up to $25,000).
298. See, e.g., IoAnio Coom ANN. § 48-616 (governing forfeiture of corporate franchises).
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B. Civil Penalties Paid to the Government for Violation of Federal FTC Act and State
UDAP Statutes
Knowing violations of the federal FTC Act give rise to "civil penalties" paid to the
government. 299 The government must prove that defendant had "actual knowledge or knowl-
edge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances" that his or her acts were unfair or
deceptive. 3m The FTC may collect $10,000 per violation.30' Most state UDAP statutes have
similar provisions, 302 many of which make the penalty collectable even without proof of will-
fulness, knowledge of, or actual harm to a consumer. 303 In some states, the penalties are
expressly designated to fund the attorney general's consumer protection efforts.30
These civil penalties are justifiable because restitution and compensation may not
reflect the gravity of the defendant's bad conduct.305 The rationales behind imposing these
penalties include recovery for damage to the public 3 0 6 disgorgement, disincentivizing the
behavior, and punishment. 307 The judge determines the amount assessed, with the maximum
set by statute. Factors taken into account include the number of violations, the number of
people damaged, the nature and extent of the public injury, and the detrimental effect of
particular violations.308 The wealth of the defendant is also relevant. 309
299. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (2006) (covering unlawful unfair methods of trade competition). This provision also
authorizes civil penalties for violations of cease and desist orders. See discussion supra Part III.A.
300. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-606 (authorizing civil penalties of "up to five thousand dollars ($5,000) per
violation"); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) (allowing for penalties of up to $2,000 per violation and not to
exceed $10,000); WASH!. Riev. Coon § 19.86.140 (providing for civil penalties up to $100,000 for a person or $500,000 for
a corporation); State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 436-47 (Wash. 1976) (giving that
penalties in Washington are assessed by each violation, not each customer harmed). These civil penalties paid to the
state are distinct from treble damages that are paid to consumers in consumer actions. See discussion supra Part II.B
(discussing monetary relief); supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing punitive damages).
303. Statutes vary across the nation. See, e.g., People ex rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d
463, 468-481 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing California law); State ex rel. Woodard v. May Dep't Stores Co., 849 P.2d
802, 808-811 (Colo. App. 1992) (interpreting the Colorado statute); McKinney v. State, 693 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind. 1998)
(explaining the Indiana statute).
304. See, e.g., IDAH0 CODE ANN. § 48-606(f)(5) ("All penalties, costs and fees recovered by the attorney general
shall be remitted to the consumer protection fund which is hereby created in the state treasury.").
305. State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1261 (Wash. 1999) ("[T]he gravity of [defendant's] violations is not limited
just to the actual damages inflicted.").
306. There is a compensatory aspect to these penalties, but they are discussed as "prevention" rather than compen-
sation because they are paid to the state, not the victims. Punishment is certainly the primary goal. May Dep't Stores Co.,
849 P.2d at 809 ("[Tlhe civil penalty award goes to [Colorado]'s general fund, and thus, its purpose is not to make an
injured party whole, but rather it is solely intended to punish the wrongdoer for its illegal acts.").
307. See, e.g., Avila v. State, 252 S.W.3d 632, 637-38 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (describing factors to consider when
assessing a penalty).
308. See Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475-482 (describing factors to consider when assessing a
penalty).
309. Id. at 480.
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Penalties may be assessed against each individual perpetrator, as well as against the
corporation for which the perpetrator works. 310 Penalties may be assessed for each violation,
even if practiced upon the same customer.3x1 States may seek one penalty per misleading
ad.3 12 These civil penalties can be thousands of dollars;313 a leading case from California
involving the unauthorized practice of law, among other things, assessed $2,543,000 in civil
penalties. 314 Large as these amounts may be, they are defined as civil, and the standard of
proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 315
C. Federal and State Crimes
1. Federal Crimes
The federal FTC Act is not a criminal statute,316 nor are most state UDAP laws.3 17
Some federal crimes may be implicated in the activities of notarios, including prohibitions
against inappropriate interstate wire transfers, use of the federal postal service, use of
government seals,318 and conspiracy.
When fraudster notarios resort to crimes like forgery, they wade into even deeper
water. For example, a Floridian notario couple that ran a business called "Welcome to
310. See State v. Ralph Williams' N.W. Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 553 P.2d 423, 439 (Wash. 1976) ("If a corporate
officer participates in the conduct, or with knowledge approves of the conduct, then the officer, as well as the corpora-
tion, is liable for the penalties.").
311. Id. at 436.
312. Id. at 436 n.12.
313. See, e.g., loAnlo CODE ANN. § 48-606(e) (allowing up to $5000 for a civil penalty); WAsH. RE~v. CouE
§ 19.86.140 (allowing up to $100,000 for a civil penalty).
314. People ex rel. Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
315. See, e.g., State ex rel. Redden v. Disc. Fabrics, Inc., 615 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Or. 1980) (providing that the standard
of proof required for a proceeding under UTPA is "preponderance of the evidence"). Civil penalties are constitutional,
and usually survive double jeopardy arguments, Eighth Amendment excessive fines prohibitions, and Fourteenth
Amendment due process challenges. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98-102 (1997) (discussing double jeop-
ardy); State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d 1257, 1261-63 (Wash. 1999) (discussing Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
prohibitions). At some point the amounts might become disproportional and excessive. People v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd., 3
Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 449-51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the amount of damages); State v. WWJ Corp., 980 P.2d at 1264-
65 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
316. This is in contrast to RICO, which contemplates expressly criminal penalties including fines and incarceration.
317. But see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-19-8(c) (1981) (providing that continuous and willful violations are a
misdemeanor).
318. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (providing a punishment of up to 15 years in jail for falsifying a government identification
or other authentication feature). In the Immigration Services case discussed above, one count was brought for misuse of
the United States seal. See supra Part II; Two Plead Guilty in Scheme to Defraud Consumers Seeking Immigration
Services, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-civ-1041.html (describing
fraud involving immigration forms).
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America, Inc." aggregated $4.5 million in fees charged for UPIL.319 They were ultimately
found to have defrauded not only their clients but also the state government, which had
issued drivers' licenses based on the estimated 3,200 false immigration documents the couple
had forged. 320 In 2011, the Department of Justice investigated and prosecuted dozens of
cases, obtaining "sentences up to eight years in prison and restitution of over $1.8 million." 321
2. State Crimes
Classic state criminal law is available as well, assuming the notario has the requisite
mens rea. Criminal liability has the practical advantage of possibly triggering the victims'
restitution statutes previously described. It also is a powerful deterrent and social declaration
that a practice is socially and morally unacceptable.
Most obvious are the crimes of theft and larceny,322 which can be a misdemeanor or a
felony depending on the amount of money stolen. 323 In particular, notaries are often guilty of
theft on the theory of fraud committed by false pretenses or trick. In most states, the penalty
for felony theft is incarceration for a period ranging between one and twenty years.324
Notarios commit the crimes of fraud or false pretenses if they intentionally hold
themselves out as something they are not.325 Some statutes use the phrase "designedly"
instead of "knowingly"-did the wrongdoer designedly use false pretenses to obtain property
from another. 326 That adverb catches the crime of the notario-by design he or she creates
and capitalizes on the confusion and insecurity of immigrants, so that immigrants think they
are taking responsible, correct, legal steps while actually falling into a premeditated trap.
319. Jane Musgrave, Lake Clarke Shores Couple Sentenced for Defrauding Immigrants, PAL M BEACH POST (Mar.
29, 2012), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/crime-law/lake-clarke-shores-acouple-sentenced-for-defrauding/
nLh4zl; Paula McMahon, Couple Face Sentencing for Immigration Fraud, SUN SENINEtL (Mar. 28, 2012), http://articles
.sun -sentinel.com/2012-03-28/news/fl-immigration-fraud-couple-20120328_1_1legal-status-undocumented-immigrants-
federal-prosecutors.
320. Musgrave, supra note 319.
321. National Initiative to Combat Immigration Services Scams, supra note 261.
322. Larceny is committed when one person takes another's property without his consent. WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
CRIMINAL LAw § 19(a) (5th ed. 2010), False pretenses and larceny by trick are committed when the wrongdoer obtains
the property from the owner by telling him lies. Id. The Model Penal Code "provides for an ambitious plan of
consolidation of [these and other] smaller separate crimes into one larger crime called 'theft."' Id. § 19.8(d).
323. See id. § 19.4(b) (giving that the dollar amounts needed to escalate the crime into a felony is from $50 to
$2000); KATIIERINE BRADY, IMMIGR. LEGAL RE~s. CTR., IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT FRAUD: LAws & RESOURCES 14-
15 (2000) (noting that crimes against multiple victims may need to be aggregated to bring the value of the property take
into felony range); Langford, supra note 6, at 116, 130 (discussing these criminal issues in the notario context).
324. See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 18-2408 (2002) (providing punishments for varying grades of theft); Tix. PENAL
Cooi § 12.35 (2011) (providing the state jail felony punishment); WAsh. Riy. CODE § 9A.56.030 (2013) (covering theft
in the first degree).
325. LAFAVE, supra note 322, § 19.7.
326. Id. §19.7(f)(1).
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Other notario practices may lead to the commission of separate crimes like forgery,
submission of false papers, extortion and assault.3 2 7 In many states, unauthorized practice of
law is a misdemeanor and in some even a felony. 328 In various states, making false or
misleading statements when preparing immigration matters is a crime in and of itself.3 2 9
Many notario offices involve more than one person, opening the door for charges of
conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION PRACTICE
In addition to remedial and deterrent measures, strong regulation of immigration
practice-laws that define its scope, identify who is authorized to provide representation,
and establish enforceable sanctions against violators-can play an important role in the bat-
tle against UPIL. The INA, the federal statute governing immigration, and its implementing
regulations include rules that specifically govern immigration practice nationwide. Every
state has its own statutes, which generally prohibit and punish the unauthorized practice of
law and regulate notaries. Several states also have statutes that specifically prohibit UPIL.
Because the federal government occupies the field of immigration law, state statutes regard-
ing UPIL may be preempted;330 however, state rules which complement rather than conflict
with federal rules potentially provide additional safeguards against UPIL. Conversely, state
laws that are inconsistent with federal regulation create confusion and may foster UPIL
rather than curtail it.
A. Federal Law
1. What Does Immigration Practice Mean?
The federal regulation scheme is conceptually simple in its precise definition of both
the categories of individuals who may practice immigration law as well as the scope, nature,
and circumstances under which non-attorneys may lawfully provide immigration services.
The problem with the federal framework is that it comprises more than a dozen provisions
scattered throughout the INA and its regulations, which must be read together to understand
327. See discussion supra Part I (considering harms caused by the unauthorized practice of immigration law).
328. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 3-420 (stating the penalties for unauthorized practice of law); TEX Gov. CODE
§ 406.017 (defining the offense of unauthorized practice of law); TEx. PENAL CODE § 38.122 (governing the crime of
falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer).
329. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAr. ANN § 12-2703 (2012) (making such conduct a felony); CAL. PENA] CODE § 653.55
(2012) (making such conduct a misdemeanor); WASH. REv. CODE7 § 19.154.060 (discussing prohibited conduct).
330. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing preemption); Shannon, supra note 173, at 453 (discussing
issues regarding preemption).
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it properly. Of course, most immigration consumers do not know how to locate the relevant
provisions and are not trained in statutory and regulatory construction. In other words,
federal law on UPIL is relatively clear for those who know how to find and interpret it, but
confusing for those who do not.
Federal regulation defines "immigration practice" broadly as "the act or acts of any
person appearing in any case, either in person or through the preparation or filing of any brief
or other document, paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or client before
or with DHS, or any immigration judge, or the Board." 331 Unless the context dictates
otherwise, "case" is defined as
any proceeding arising under any immigration or naturalization law,
Executive Order, or Presidential proclamation, or preparation for or
incidental to such proceeding, including preliminary steps by any pri-
vate person or corporation preliminary to the filing of the application
or petition which any proceeding under the jurisdiction of [federal
immigration agencies] is initiated.332
The INA permits "service consisting solely of assistance in the completion of blank spaces on
[government immigration] forms" if provided for free or at nominal cost and if the service
provider "does not hold himself out as qualified in legal matters or in immigration and natu-
ralization procedure."333 The term "representation" includes practice and preparation as de-
scribed above.334
These rules are useful in combating UPIL for at least two reasons. First, the defini-
tion of immigration practice is relatively precise and theoretically puts the public, including
potential immigration practitioners and consumers, on notice as to what is permitted and
what is not. Second, the definition is broad in that it encompasses not only acts performed in
person at the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) or DHS, but also work
undertaken in preparing immigration applications and related documents, in filing them, or
in conducting post-filing tasks. This definition prohibits the kind of activities in which
notarios frequently engage, such as preparing documents which require formal training in
immigration law and providing legal consultation or advice. Essentially, a licensed attorney
or other federally authorized provider of immigration services must perform all work related
to matters arising under immigration law.
331. 8 C.F.R. §1001.1(i) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1.2 (defining "practice").
332. Id. §1001.1(g) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1.2. Similarly, the term "preparation, constituting practice,
means the study of the facts of a case and the applicable laws, combined with the giving of advice and auxiliary activities,
including the incidental preparation of [immigration-related] papers . Id. § 1001.1(k); see also id. § 1.2 (defining
"preparation").
333. Id. § 1001.1(k) (emphasis added); see also id. §1.2 (explaining what type of service is permitted).
334. Id. § 1001.1(m); see also id. § 1.2 (defining "representation").
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2. Who May Lawfully Practice Immigration Law?
Federal law limits immigration representation to six categories of individuals: (1)
attorneys in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state;33 5 (2) specially
accredited representatives acting as employees of "recognized agencies" authorized by the
federal government to provide immigration assistance;336 (3) supervised, unpaid students
enrolled in a law school clinic, with the consent of both the client and the adjudicator;33 7 (4)
unpaid, supervised law graduates, again with the permission of the client and the
adjudicator;338 (5) unpaid "reputable" non-attorneys of "good moral character" who have a
pre-existing relationship with and the consent of the individual entitled to representation,
and the adjudicator's approval;339 and (6) unpaid, "reputable" individuals of "good moral
character" who have no pre-existing relationship with person entitled to representation, if
the adjudicator determines that adequate representation would not otherwise be available.340
Representatives must file a signed notice of appearance in every immigration matter and
demonstrate that they fall within one of the prescribed categories.341
a. Recognized Agency 34 2
To become a "recognized agency" authorized by the government to represent indi-
viduals in immigration matters, a non-profit organization must file an application with the
BIA which demonstrates that the agency is established in the United States, will not charge
more than a nominal fee for immigration services, and "has at its disposal adequate knowl-
edge, information, and experience" in immigration law.343 The BIA has held that "nominal,"
although not defined as a specific dollar amount, typically means "a very small quantity" and
is determined on a case-by-case basis. 344 The knowledge, information, and experience re-
quirement is typically met if the organization proves that it is associated with an attorney
competent in immigration law who can provide legal assistance and support to agency em-
335. Id. § 1292.1(a)(1); see also id. §1001.1(f) (defining "attorney").
336. Id. § 1292.1(a)(4).
337. Id. § 1292.1(a)(2).
338. Id.
339. Id. § 1292.1(a)(3) (providing a non-exhaustive list of such individuals, including a relative, neighbor,
clergyman, business associate or personal friend).
340. Id. Categories 5 and 6 are particularly susceptible to abuse because they provide virtually no concrete
guidance as to how an adjudicator should evaluate the identity of such individuals, whether they are qualified to provide
competent-or even helpful-assistance, or how to evaluate with any degree of uniformity, the circumstances under
which adjudicators should allow such representation.
341. Id. § 1292.1(f).
342. For an overview of recognition and accreditation requirements, see Recognition & Accreditation (R &A)
Program, U.S. DEP'T OF1 JUSTICE, WWW.jUstice.gov/eoir/statspub/raroster.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
343. 8 C.F.R. §1292.2(a).
344. Matter of American Paralegal Academy, Inc., 19 1. & N. Dec. 386, 387 (BIA 1986).
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ployees, and has access to relevant legal materials, training, and practice updates. 34 5 The BIA
may order the withdrawal of an agency's recognition for failing to maintain these
qualifications. 346
b. Federally Accredited Representatives Employed by a Recognized Agency
A recognized agency may apply to the BIA for one or more non-attorney employees
to become an "accredited representative," permitted to practice before USCIS alone (partial
accreditation) or before USCIS, immigration court, and the BIA (full accreditation). 347 The
accreditation application must describe the nature and extent of the work to be performed
by proposed representatives, designate the category of accreditation sought, document their
experience and knowledge of immigration law, and include letters of recommendation re-
garding their skills, ability, and good moral character. 3 4 8
Applications for accreditation must also show that the proposed representative is in
regular contact with an expert immigration lawyer.349 Accredited representatives cannot
receive personal remuneration and only retain accreditation while working for the same
BIA-recognized non-profit organization under whose auspices they originally obtained the
accreditation. 3 50 In other words, accredited representatives cannot practice immigration law
as private individuals, and their accreditation is not portable.
The BIA investigates and assesses whether the proposed representative meets the
qualifications for the requested designation and issues a decision. Accreditation is valid for
three years.3 5' An application for renewed accreditation must be affirmatively and timely
filed, but accreditation remains valid until the Board makes a renewal decision.352 Applica-
tions for renewal must meet standards similar to those for initial accreditation?.53
3. Oversight and Discipline of Immigration Practitioners
The Board of Immigration Appeals bears primary responsibility for overseeing
conduct by attorneys and non-attorneys authorized by regulation to provide legal assistance
345. See, e.g., Matter of EAC, 24 1. & N. Dec. 556, 558-59 (BIA 2008) (describing how to satisfy requirements for
recognition).
346. 8 C.F.R. §1292.2(d).
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., Matter of EAC, supra note 322, at 561-562 (analyzing application for accreditation).
349. See id. at 558-59 (describing the requirement of adequate knowledge and expertise).
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in immigration matters. 354 Although the Board may discipline immigration practitioners who
assist unauthorized practice of law, it has no jurisdiction to discipline individuals, such as
notarios, who are not covered by 8 C.F.R. §H 1001.1(f) or 1292.35 Accordingly, discipline and
sanction of those not authorized to practice immigration law are left to miscellaneous state
and federal agencies such as the FTC, consumer fraud offices, bar associations, and notary
boards, and to the civil and criminal courts, if an appropriate cause of action is filed by a
government agency or an aggrieved individual.356
The BIA publishes an online roster of recognized organizations and individual
accredited representatives that is updated on a weekly basis.357 Additionally, the BIA
publishes a list of currently and previously sanctioned immigration practitioners.358
Attorneys, accredited representatives, and others authorized to appear in immigration
matters under 8 C.F.R. § 1292 may be sanctioned for misconduct.359 Disciplinary sanctions
include disbarment, suspension, and censure. 360 Numerous grounds for sanction exist,361
including assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, 36 2 and, in the case of accredited
representatives, law clinic students or law graduates, for receiving remuneration from a
client. 36 3
4. Brief Critique of Federal Provisions
Prescribed requirements for recognition and accreditation standards provide some
degree of quality control among non-attorney immigration practitioners. Compliance with
these requirements potentially yields increased access to competent representation in
immigration matters, and theoretically decreases reliance on notarios and others engaged in
UPIL. Accredited representatives and recognized agencies, however, are arguably subject to
354. Id. H§ 1003.1(d)(5) (describing power of the BIA to discipline attorneys and representatives), 1003.101-106
(providing the same), 1292.3 (providing the same); see also Matter of Gadda, 23 I. & N. Dec. 645, 649-50 (BIA 2003)
(describing the BIA's authority to impose sanctions). Rules governing BIA complaints against are found at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1003.101; 1003.102(h), (k); 1003.103(c); 1003.104(a)(1), (b); 1003.105; 1003.106; 1003.107; 1292.3.
355. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.102(m) (providing that a person may be sanctioned for unauthorized practice of law).
356. See discussion supra Parts II, III (regarding remedies that individuals may pursue and regulation of notarios).
357. See Recognized Organizations and Accredited Representatives by City and State, Exe'c. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR.
REVIFw, U.S. Dm,", OF JusricE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ra/raroster_ orgs-repsstatescity.htm (last visited Oct. 25,
2013) (providing a list of recognized organizations and accredited representatives).
358. List of Currently Disciplined Practitioners, EXFc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. RFVIEW, U.S. DEPr OF JUSTICE, http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/discipline.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). In a welcome development, some immigration courts
(New York City's, for example) post current lists of disciplined practitioners on bulletin boards outside courtrooms.
359. 8 C.F.R. §1003.101(b).
360. Id. § 1003.101(a).
361. Id. §1003.102.
362. Id. §1003.102(m).
363. Id. §§ 1003.102(a)(2), (3).
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less scrutiny than attorneys who face regular review and possible discipline by both the BIA
and state bar associations.
Applicants for initial accreditation and renewal of accreditation must satisfy broad
criteria, such as demonstrated knowledge of and experience in immigration law as well as
ongoing access to or supervision by a licensed attorney.36 Applicants for renewal must
demonstrate that during the period since their previous BIA approval, they have kept
abreast of developments in immigration law and practice and have been engaged in ongoing
immigration training. 365 Critics argue, however, that the requirements are vague and lack
uniformity, as written and as applied, and are not always strictly enforced. 366 To improve the
system, Professor Careen Shannon and Emily Unger recommend amendments to federal
regulation of accredited representatives. Both propose that the BIA develop and administer
a competency exam, based on a standardized curriculum, to test applicants' knowledge of
immigration law and professional ethics,367 and require completion of specified additional
training for reaccreditation. 368 Unger also suggests that the BIA "post each applicant's name,
license number, accreditation status, sanction history, and photo on its website," and
"require accredited representatives to conspicuously display their name, license number, and
the BIA web address in their office and . . . include this information on all contracts and
receipts." 3 69 She points out these additional requirements "would allow consumers to check
the status of a representative, prevent consultants from falsely claiming representation, and
give consumers an easier mechanism to report abuses." 370 The virtue of these proposals is
that they would provide uniformity in evaluating accreditation applications, enhance sound
immigration law training of accredited representatives, offer consumers a relatively simple
way to verify whether an individual is properly accredited, and facilitate the reporting of
alleged abuses. Implementation of such proposals would also be cost-effective, requiring
little or no additional cost to accreditation applicants or to the U.S. government, and has the
potential to reduce the systemic costs involved in poor or fraudulent representation.
In sum, current federal regulation of immigration law practice must be fortified and
should include measures such as those suggested above. As proposals for capacity-building
initiatives become a reality, federal regulation of immigration practice will require
amendments carefully tailored to balance the need for a larger pool of representatives with
364. See id. § 1292.2(d) (describing requirements for recognition).
365. See, e.g., Matter of EAC, Inc., 24 I. & N. Dec. 563, 564 (BIA 2008) (discussing requirements for accreditation).
366. Emily A. Unger, Solving Immigration Consultant Fraud Through Expanded Federal Accreditation, 29 LAw &
INEOu. 425, 445-48 (2011) (discussing how to strengthen and better implement requirements for accreditation).
367. Id. at 446 (suggesting changes to improve oversight of immigration practitioners); To License or Not to
License, supra note 173, at 485 (discussing what can be done at the federal level to oversee the competency of
immigration practitioners).
368. To License or Not to License, supra note 173, at 485.
369. Unger, supra note 366, at 447.
370. Id. at 448. Unger also suggests a campaign to educate immigrant communities about accreditation. Id.
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the risk that expanded categories of individuals and organizations permitted to practice
immigration law will create new opportunities for fraud.
B. State Regulation of Immigration Practitioners
Each state has its own rules for regulating the practice of law. States' approaches to
UPIL vary significantly from one another-and often from federal law-and typically do not
apply outside the borders of each state.
In the context of UPIL, state rules fall into four general categories: (1) statutes that
forbid the unauthorized practice of law generally, do not specifically address UPIL, and do
conflict with federal regulations; (2) statutes that forbid the unauthorized practice of law
generally, do not specifically regulate UPIL, and do not conflict with federal rules; (3) stat-
utes that specifically regulate immigration law practice and do not conflict with federal regu-
lations; and (4) statutes that specifically regulate immigration law practice and do conflict
with federal regulation.
1. Examples of State Regulation
a. Idaho
Idaho's broad unauthorized practice of law statute forbids non-attorneys from pro-
viding any kind of legal assistance, thereby implicitly prohibiting the unauthorized practice
of immigration law.371 Idaho's blanket proscription has the virtue of simplicity: only licensed
attorneys can practice law, including immigration law. Idaho courts have clarified that "the
practice of law" includes not only the performance of legal services in matters pending in
court but also "legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not [pending] in a court."372
371. See IAHlo CODE ANN. §3-420 (forbidding individuals who have not been admitted or licensed to practice law
in Idaho, or whose right or license to practice has been terminated, from practicing, acting, or holding themselves out as
lawyers). A conviction for unlawful practice of law may result in a $500.00 fine, imprisonment not to exceed six months,
or both, as well as a finding of being in contempt of court. Id. §§ 3-420, 3-104. Persons who have been admitted to
practice law shall also be subject to suspension. Id. § 3-420; see also IAtio BAR COMM'N Rui t, 804 (1998) (authorizing
the Idaho State Bar Counsel to investigate complaints of unauthorized practice of law, issue cease and desist letters, and
maintain permanent records related to unauthorized practice of law).
372. See Idaho State Bar v. Villegas, 879 P.2d 1124 (Idaho 1994) (holding that a self-proclaimed "public adjuster"
who helped evaluate, investigate and settle civil claims had engaged in the unlawful practice of law); Idaho State Bar v.
Meservy, 335 P.2d 62, 64 (Idaho 1959) (holding that an individual who provided legal advice and drafted pleadings and a
proposed order for filing in court had engaged in unlawful practice of law); State v. Wees, 58 P.3d 103, 106-07 (Idaho Ct.
App. 2002) (finding Wees guilty of unauthorized practice of law because he interviewed and advised customers on legal
issues, and helped them draft documents to file in state court).
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Accordingly, Idaho precedent interprets "unauthorized practice of law" in a manner largely
consistent with federal immigration law.373
The Idaho statute, however, is inconsistent with federal rules that govern immigration
law practice. Federal law affirmatively permits non-attorney representatives, accredited by
the BIA and employed by BIA-recognized agencies, as well as attorneys in good standing in
the bar of any state in the United States to represent individuals in immigration matters. 374
Despite the state statute's facial inconsistency with federal provisions, Idaho has generally
respected federal rules governing immigration representation. Still, for the sake of clarity,
the state should consider amending its unauthorized practice of law statute to include an
explicit provision incorporating or referencing the federal rules on immigration practice.
b. Washington
Prompted by years of experience litigating against Washington state notarios, the
Washington Attorney General's Office, working with community-based organizations such
as the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, proposed a bill to eliminate statutory loopholes
facilitating notario fraud and to strengthen penalties against offenders. 3 7 5 The bill, eventually
enacted as the Immigration Services Fraud Prevention Act of 2011,376 states, in relevant part,
that "persons, other than those licensed to practice law in this state or otherwise permitted to
practice law or represent others under federal law in an immigration matter, are prohibited
from engaging in [immigration practice]. . . ."377 The virtue of this language is its consistency
with federal immigration law. The language could also serve as a model for an amendment to
Idaho's unauthorized practice of law statute to bring it into line with federal rules regarding
immigration practitioners. The Washington amendments also eliminate the term "immigra-
tion assistant" from the previously existing legislation and provide harsher penalties for
violators.378
2. State Regulation of Notaries Public
State notary boards govern notaries. Some notarios are true renegades, who are not
licensed notaries, rendering notary boards virtually helpless to punish them directly. Other
373. See supra Part IV.A (discussing federal law).
374. 8 C.F.R. § 1292.
375. Molly Rosbach, Washington Notarios Bill Combats Immigration Fraud, TIIE SE-ArrE.i- TIMES (Feb. 5, 2011),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2014139113_apwaxgrnotarioslstldwritethru.html; Federal and State Officials Ex-
pose Immigration Service Scams, Unveil New Prevention and Enforcement Initiatives, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE
Arf-ORNEY GEN., (June 9, 2011), http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?id=28224#.UqkyvfSryDs%
2 0.
376. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. H§ 19.154.010 (2011) (describing the state legislature's findings).
377. Id. § 19.154.060.
378. Id.; see also id. § 19.154.090(2) (describing penalties that may be imposed).
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notarios are actual state notaries who overstep their power and commit UPIL. Licensing
sanctions against them can be fairly effective. As Abrams and Fulghum observe, "[B]ecause
the notary commission is often the 'seal' of legitimacy that notarios use as a pretense to
present to practice law, taking away that symbol of authority is an effective way to shut them
down." 379 Some notary laws specifically address notario deception in the immigration
context 3 s including whether or not notaries may use Spanish translations of the phrase
"notary public."38 1 Violations of such provisions sometimes carry criminal penalties 382 and
serve as the basis for injunctions. Those states that forbid the use of the word "notario" by
notaries advertising their services have effectively decided that its use is per se deceptive. A
flat ban on using the term allows little room for interpretive ambiguities, so violations are
more readibly provable. The proscription has the added benefit of preventing harm
committed by notarios not directly in front of the court.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION AND EFFECTIVE REPORTING MECHANISMS
Immigration consumers who are educated about the dangers of UPIL are more likely
to avoid it. Ideally, an education campaign not only underscores the potentially adverse
consequences of hiring a notario, it also teaches how to identify and report suspected UPIL
for investigation and possible legal action; whether affordable and competent representation
379. Jason Abrams & Thomas E. Fulgham, Battling Against Notarios: Waging War Against the Unlicensed,
Unqualified, and Incompetent, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAw HANDBOOK 123, 127 (2009-2010).
380. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STA-r. ANN. § 41-367(A) (2000) (providing that any notary public who advertises in a
language other than English shall post a notice in that language "I am not an attorney and cannot give legal advice about
immigration or other legal matters"); INo. Coo, ANN. § 33-42-2-2 (prohibiting notaries from taking acknowledgement
of persons that do not understand English). Violation is a class six felony and results in permanent revocation of the
notary's commission. ARz. Ri-v. STAT. ANN. § 41-367(B). This law demonstrates the difficulty of the problem-a true
scoundrel, not even a notary, would not be covered.
381. See, e.g., ARK. CoDE ANN. § 4-109-102 (2005) (making it unlawful for a person to advertise services using the
terms "notario," "notario publico" or other similar terms unless they meet the definition provided for by law); CAL.
Gov. CODE § 8219.5 (1976) (giving requirements for advertising in languages other than English and the posting of
notices related to legal advice and fees); Coi-o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-55-110.3 (2004) (describing advertisement of
services, the unauthorized practice of law and prohibited conduct); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2AA (2005)
(prohibiting the phrase "poder notarial"); IND. CODE § 33-42-2-10; (2007) (covering fraudulent advertising and
misrepresentation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 53-121 (2006) (giving requirements for notaries advertising in foreign
languages); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4 § 960 (2006) (discussing advertisement of services); Micii. Comp. LAWS § 55.291
(2006) (setting forth requirements for the advertisement of services); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 64.105.03 (2004)
(discussing notaries public, unauthorized practice of law and prohibited behavior); NEV. Rav. STA-r. § 240.085 (2005)
(covering advertisements in a language other than English if the notary public is not an attorney); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-12A-15 (2003) (covering the unauthorized practice of law); OKL-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 49 § 6 (2003) (discussing the
provision of legal advice); Tix. Gov. ConE § 406.017 (2001) (covering representation as an attorney); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 137.01 (2013) (covering notaries).
382. See, e.g., INi. CoDE. ANN. § 35-43-5-3.7 (2013) (providing that the notario publico designation is a Class A
misdemeanor in Indiana).
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by lawyers or federally accredited representatives is locally available, and; about potential
immigration, civil and criminal remedies.
A. Non-governmental and Community-Based Organizations
Until relatively recently, efforts to educate immigrant communities about notario
fraud were mainly localized and relied on non-governmental community based groups. Dur-
ing the last half-dozen years, however, non-governmental organizations with a national
reach, such as the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) and the Catholic Legal Immi-
gration Network (CLINIC), have created resources to combat UPIL through broader, more
coordinated public education initiatives and to assist community-based groups that work
with immigrants.383 Education materials prepared by ILRC and CLINIC teach immigrants
about adverse consequences of notario fraud and how to identify, avoid, and report UPIL.
They include posters, cartoon booklets, talking points and PowerPoint presentations, and
suggestions for skits and role-playing-particularly popular and effective in communities
where immigrants may not be literate.38 The organizations' resources are free, simple to
understand, accurate, and easy to adapt to the needs of specific audiences. Materials are
available in multiple languages, including English, Spanish, Haitian Creole, Chinese, Korean,
Arabic, Serbian, Croatian, Tagalog, Farsi, and Urdu.385
B. Professional Organizations
Professional organizations such as the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) have become involved in educating
their members as well as immigration consumers about how to identify, report, and take
action against UPIL.3 8 6 In just the last year, AILA has undertaken an ambitious program of
383. See Anti-Fraud Campaign, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CiR., http://www.ilrc.org/policy-advocacy/anti-fraud-
campaign (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (describing the organization's anti-fraud advocacy efforts).
384. See For Immigrants/Para Inmigrantes, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. OfR., http://www.ilrc.org/for-immigrants-para-in
migrantes (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing education materials for immigrants); Notario and Immigration Consult-
ant Fraud Resources, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, INC., http://cliniclegal.org/resources/notario-and-immigration-
consultant-fraud-resources (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (providing educational resources to address notario fraud).
385. Anti-Fraud Flyers, IMMIGR. LEGAL REs. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/for-immigrants-para-inmigrantes/anti-fraud-
flyers (last visited Oct. 26, 2013); Anti-Fraud Comics, IMMIGR. LEGAL RES. CrR., http://www.ilrc.org/for-immigrants-
para-inmigrantes/anti-fraud-comic-books (last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
386. See AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS Ass'N, GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMERS: HOW AND WHERE ro FiLE COMPLAINTS
AGAINST NOTARIOS AND IMMIGRATION CONSULTANTS 18 (2013) (providing a state-by-state list of resources to fight
notario fraud); Fight Notario Fraud, AM. BAR AsS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public-services/immigration/
projects-initiatives/fightnotariofraud.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (describing the ABA's Fight Notario Fraud pro-
ject); Stop Notario Fraud, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS'N, http://www.stopnotariofraud.org (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
(describing AILA's efforts to stop notario fraud).
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anti-notario education, which includes the development and nationwide dissemination of
multi-media public service announcements (PSAs) at no charge for use in immigrant com-
munities.38 7 AILA also assists groups with press contacts and instructions for how to place
PSAs.3
State and local bar associations have also stepped up to the plate. The New York
State Bar Association and the New York City Bar Association, in particular, have under-
taken comprehensive education of its members and the broader public. Prompted by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Robert Katzmann's Study Group on Immigrant Rep-
resentation 389 and drawing on the expertise of the New York City Legal Aid Society, New
York State Legal Services Corporation, and numerous other organizations, both bar associa-
tions have conducted and published studies, presented results in public venues, and made
specific recommendations for action.390
C. Federal Government Agencies
Since 2009, three federal agencies-the FTC, USCIS, and the Department of Justice
(DOJ)-have implemented education and capacity-building initiatives.391 Based in part on
information obtained during such collaborative efforts, the FTC and DOJ, along with state
Attorney General offices, have filed legal complaints against notarios, sometimes rooted in
evidence provided by USCIS and the Department of Homeland Security's HSI. USCIS, the
FTC, and DOJ have launched aggressive campaigns highlighting the problem of UPIL and
suggesting ways to report it, including informational websites, flyers, and tweets. 3 9 2
387. See PSA on Comprehensive Immigration Reform and Notarios (Updated 4/29/13), Am. Immigr. Law. Ass'n
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=44060 (providing flyers for distribution and education of
immigrant groups).
388. See id. (indicating AILA is willing to help with press contacts).
389. See Symposium, Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Immigration Proceedings New
York Immigrant Representation Study Report, 33 CARiozo L. REV. 357 (2011) [hereinafter Accessing Justice] (discuss-
ing issues related to access to justice and counsel in removal proceedings); Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession
and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 21 GEo. J. LEGAi ETHics 3, 8 (2008) (discussing the need for counsel and
problems caused by notarios).
390. See generally Accessing Justice, supra note 389 (discussing these issues); N.Y. IMMIGRANT REPRESENTATION
STUDY STEERING COMM., ACCESSING JUSTICE II: A MODEL FOR PROVIDING COUNSEL TO NEw YORK IMMIGRANTS IN
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS (2012) (discussing the same).
391. See, e.g., National Initiative to Combat Immigration Services Scams DHS, DOJ and FTC Collaborate with State
and Local Partners in Unprecedented Effort, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., U.S. DEPWT OF HOMELAND SEC. (June
9, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6dla/?vgnextoid=01083ffa
9157031OVgnVCM100000082ca6OaRCRD (discussing this collaborative effort).
392. See, e.g., Avoid Scams, U.S. CIflZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERvs., U.S. DEPT OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.
uscis.gov/avoidscams (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing tools to avoid scams); U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,
Message, TwrIER (May 16, 2013 at 8:11 AM), https://twitter.com/USCIS/status/331426014683078656 (providing a link
to the USCIS website on avoiding scams).
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Governments of other countries have also begun to educate their citizens living in the
United States about UPIL. Consular officials in some states have forged relationships with
United States and state government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs) and
attorneys on anti-notario efforts aimed at identifying local notarios, teaching how to report
fraud, and providing information on legitimate service providers. 393 For instance, Mexico's
Secretary of Exterior Relations (SRE) and the Center of Information about the Realities of
Migration (CIAM) recently issued a Spanish language flyer warning immigrants to be wary
of notarios who try to persuade consumers that the U.S. Congress has already enacted com-
prehensive immigration reform and who promise to secure green cards for a price. 394 The
flyer includes the web address of a USCIS Spanish language website with immigration law
updates and information about how to denounce immigration fraud.395 Additionally, the
flyer includes a CIAM phone number that Mexican nationals can call with inquiries about
immigration law and notario abuse in the United States.396
D. State Governments
State governments are increasingly active in educating immigration consumers about
notario fraud.397 Some State Attorney General (AG) offices, typically through their con-
sumer fraud divisions, have not only developed educational resources about UPIL for immi-
grants, they have additionally begun to serve as conduits for accepting notario fraud
complaints and funneling them to the appropriate state or federal agency for follow-up
action.
E. Collaboration Between the Private and Public Sectors
Collaboration among federal and state governmental agencies, national and local
non-governmental groups, and professional organizations are particularly welcome develop-
ments. Coordinated approaches not only raise community awareness of UPIL, they maxi-
393. In Boise, Idaho, for example, the Mexican consulate has collaborated with federal and state authorities, CBOs,
and private attorneys in anti-UPIL initiatives. See infra notes 401-06 and accompanying text.
394. See SE'CRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE MEXICO & CENTRO DE INFORMACI6N SOBRE ACUALIDAD




397. See Report Immigration Scams, U.S. CrnzENsInlP & IMMIGR. SERvs., U.S. DiEP'T oF. HOMELAND Src., http://
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.e8b24a3cec33ca34c48bfcl0526e0aa0/?vgnextoid=E309d4aaee6ab2lOVgnVCM
1O0000b92ca6aRCRD&vgnextchannel=6358d4aaee6ab210VgnVCM 00000b92ca60aRCRD (last visited Oct. 26, 2013)
(providing links to state agencies with whom notario fraud victims can file complaints). Some state websites also have
easy-to-find reporting resources. See, e.g., Immigration Services, WAsI. STATE OFFICE OF TIE A rfORNEY GEN., http://
www.atg.wa.gov/immigrationservices.aspx#.USBzvEllZSU (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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mize the potential for increased reporting, enforcement activity, successful court action, and
capacity-building.398 In Washington state, for example, public and private cooperation not
only resulted in successful civil prosecution but also the development of legislation that more
effectively addresses notario fraud than its predecessor statutes.3 9 9
Some public-private partnerships are geared toward attorneys, while others reach out
to community groups that work with immigrants. "Reaching Victims of Notario Fraud," pro-
duced and presented by several national and local non-government actors-the Immigration
Advocates Network (IAN), ILRC, the ABA, the law office of Abrams and Abrams, and the
FTC is an excellent example of a collaboration aimed at both audiences.400
Other initiatives are designed to communicate information directly to immigrant con-
sumers. For instance, in Idaho, Catholic Charities of Idaho, USCIS, pro bono attorneys, the
Idaho Legal Action Network, and local radio stations work together on programs that ex-
plain how to identify common signs of UPIL, the dangers of relying on notario, and how to
report suspected abuse.
In 2012, in Boise, Idaho, the U.S. Attorney's Office and USCIS hosted several meet-
ings that brought together diverse public and private actors engaged in anti-notario work.401
In addition to the U.S. Attorney and USCIS, participants included representatives of federal
and state agencies-the FTC, HSI, and the Office of the Idaho Attorney General-and non-
state actors-the University of Idaho Immigration Law Clinic, representatives of the Idaho
Bar Association's Office of Ethics and Professional Responsibility and Volunteer Lawyers
Program, Idaho refugee resettlement agencies, community-based and religious organizations
with immigrant constituencies, and members of the private bar.402 Representatives of the
Mexican Consulate in Boise also attended. 403
The meetings had three purposes: (1) to better understand the scope of each partici-
pant's work in combating notario fraud; (2) to share concerns and observations about spe-
cific instances of suspected UPIL, and; (3) to provide a foundation for future exchange of
information and reporting about suspected UPIL, collaboration in pursuing legal actions
398. See, e.g., ConIFN, supra note 34, at 56 (discussing the successes of these efforts).
399. See Molly Rosbach, Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Combat Legal Fraud, TiHE WENATCHEE WORLD (Feb. 12,
2011), http://www.wenatcheeworld.com/news/201I/feb/12/lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-combat-legal-fraud/ (describing
the success of collaborative efforts).
400. See ABA Comm'n on Immigration & Immigration Advocates Network, Webinar: Reaching Victims of Notario
Fraud (May 22, 2012).
401. Meeting Agenda, Office of the U.S. Attorney for Idaho (Jan. 25, 2012) (on file with authors); Letter of Invita-
tion to Participate in UPIL Outreach Meetings from Robert Mather, USCIS Denver District Director to author (Aug.
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against alleged notarios, and development of coordinated education and capacity-building
initiatives. 404 The meetings prompted subsequent presentations by USCIS, the U.S. Attorney
for Idaho, the Idaho Deputy Attorney General for Consumer Fraud, HSI, and non-govern-
mental experts at a variety of venues in immigrant communities. 40 5 A primary objective of
these presentations was to familiarize immigration consumers not only with the dangers of
UPIL but also to build constructive relationships among consumers, advocates, and repre-
sentatives of government agencies that are critical to successful anti-notario efforts. In the
last two years, successful governmental and non-governmental face-to-face initiatives have
occurred with greater frequency throughout the United States.406
F. The Need to Strengthen Links Between Anti-Notario Education and Effective
Procedures to Report and Follow-Up Suspected Fraud
Although collaborative government and non-government initiatives to educate immi-
gration consumers and advocates about the dangers of UPIL have made great strides, more
attention must be paid to the attendant need to develop simple and effective guidance about
procedures for reporting, monitoring, and assisting victims with potential legal recourse.
Currently, no uniform method exists to file, process or track individual notario com-
plaints or to share information among government and non-governmental actors. In a wel-
come development, however, the FTC's Consumer Sentinel Network, which accepts
consumer complaints, including allegations of notario fraud, recently expanded its roster of
registered agencies and the ability of those agencies to search reports more easily across a
greater number of databases.407 Member agencies are restricted to government entities in-
cluding many international, foreign, federal, state, and local government agencies.408 Current
members include ICE, the EOIR's immigration courts, the U.S. Postal Service, consumer
fraud and law enforcement offices in numerous states and localities, several foreign law en-
forcement agencies, and other entities active in addressing notario fraud.4 09 Although the
Sentinel Network neither resolves nor necessarily tracks individual cases, it can now rely on
404. Id. Since these meetings, anecdotal evidence suggests a rise in reporting of notario activity to government
agencies by immigrants and their attorneys and by CBOs.
405. Meeting Notes, UPIL Outreach Meetings (Aug. 16, 2012) (on file with authors).
406. See CoHEN, supra note 34, at 63-64.
407. See Consumer Sentinel Network, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-
network (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (describing the FTC's Consumer Sentinel Network); FED). TRAi)EI COMM'N, TitE
FTC's CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/consumer-
sentinel-network/factsheet.pdf (describing the same).
408. See Organization Registration, CONSUMER SENTINEi NETWORK, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://register.
consumersentinel.gov/Agency/AgencyLookup.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (providing a list of Sentinel members);
Consumer Sentinel Network Contributors, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/consumer-sentinel-
network/data-contributors (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (listing contributors).
409. Organization Registration, supra note 408.
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government agencies to detect patterns of UPIL reports, thus facilitating investigation and
prosecution.
The Sentinel Network appears to have no mechanism to provide follow-up and assis-
tance directly to most individuals or any publicly available protocols for monitoring particu-
lar notarios, even those who have been found liable for fraud.
Reporting mechanisms are now increasingly available to individual immigration con-
sumers through multiple federal and state agencies, and information about how and where to
file complaints has been integrated into most public education campaigns. For example, in
additional to the FTC, USCIS, the EOIR, states attorney general, the ABA, and state and
local bar associations and nongovernmental networks have developed websites with instruc-
tions about how to report allegations of notario fraud. Some government and non-govern-
ment agencies have also started to cross-reference offices that accept UPIL complaints.
Cross-linking among public and private sectors is useful because it can facilitate information
sharing among different entities active in anti-notario work and expands the possibility that a
victim will actually receive assistance.
The recently published Notario Fraud Manual provides excellent practical guidance
for reporting. The Manual includes model templates for gathering information from alleged
victims and examples of well-drafted UPIL complaints. Importantly, the Manual also dis-
cusses how to generally assist victims, to understand the positive aspects of filing a complaint
as well as its shortcomings, and, specifically, to help individual immigration consumers assess
the potential pros and cons of reporting.410
Recent efforts notwithstanding, the bottom line is that mechanisms for reporting,
tracking, and resolving cases of suspected notario fraud are piecemeal and thus are not as
useful as they could be. The absence of regularized follow up and resolution also minimizes
the incentives for reporting fraud. As a practical matter, education about UPIL will be pri-
marily preventive in nature until more regularized, coordinated, and transparent procedures
for reporting and tracking complaints and providing direct assistance to victims are
developed.
410. See NOTARIO FRAUD REMEDIES, supra note 78, at 13-25, 75-90, App. I.A, III (discussing information gather-
ing, complaints and referrals.
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VI. CAPACITY BUILDING
Chief among the reasons for the persistence of UPIL is the scarcity of affordable and
competent legal representation in immigration matters.411 The INA provides a right to immi-
gration counsel but only at no cost to the federal government. Accordingly, efforts to in-
crease the availability of quality counsel focus on building capacity in the private sector.
Non-governmental organizations play a central role in capacity building, and, increasingly,
federal and state agencies provide training for pro bono attorneys and accredited representa-
tives to facilitate free immigration representation. Capacity-building initiatives typically fall
into one or more of the following categories: formation of volunteer attorney networks at
local, state, and federal levels; development of pro bono programs by the federal courts and
the BIA to expand appellate representation of immigrants; creation of law school clinics; and
building and strengthening federally recognized non-profit organizations and increasing the
number and quality of their accredited representatives. The ABA, AILA, and private attor-
neys have also recently established pro bono training and opportunities for attorneys inter-
ested in helping immigration consumers defrauded by UPIL.41 2
A. Volunteer Attorney Networks Organized by Non-Profit and Professional Groups
Since at least the 1980s, non-profit and professional organizations such as the ABA,
AILA, and state and local bar associations have become increasingly active in establishing or
supporting programs that focus on training and coordinating pro bono and low-cost attor-
neys to represent financially-eligible immigrants in various kinds of cases. Some of the earli-
est initiatives emphasized representation of individuals in deportation proceedings who were
seeking asylum because of political repression and civil war in their home countries. Recent
efforts also include representation of undocumented survivors of domestic violence and
other statutorily enumerated crimes, unaccompanied minors, and detainees.
Pro bono immigration work can be beneficial for private attorneys and firms for sev-
eral reasons. First, immigration cases often provide lawyers with the opportunity to develop
important lawyering skills. They typically require client interviews and preparation, working
with expert witnesses in diverse fields, motion and brief writing practice, and significant
courtroom experience. In addition, as more states move toward mandatory or aspirational
pro bono requirements, attorneys have a greater incentive to take on volunteer representa-
tion of immigrants. Asylum applicants and victims of domestic violence, crime, and traffick-
411. See CATHOL ic Li GAL IMMIGR. NErwORK, INC., STARTING A LEGAL IMMIGRATION PROGRAM: THE NEED IOR
CHARITABLE LEGAL IMMIGRATION SERVICEs 1 (2010) [hereinafter STARTING A LEGAL IMMIGRATION PROGRAM]
(describing need for immigration legal services).
412. See, e.g., ABA Comm'n on Immigration & Bryan Cave LLP, Fighting Notario Fraud: Consumer Protection
Theories, VA. STArE BAR (June 20, 2012), http://www.vsb.org/site/news/item/fighting-notario-fraud-ABA-2012-07.
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ing who may qualify for legal status under the INA as well as individuals whose removal
would result in family separation are typically seen as the most sympathetic clients. Particu-
larly in an anti-immigrant political environment, private attorneys and firms that might oth-
erwise be hesitant to handle immigration cases may be more willing to provide
representation to individuals likely eligible for these forms of relief. Many lawyers also find
that providing legal assistance to some of the most vulnerable individuals who would not
otherwise have representation is uniquely rewarding. Further, attorneys interested in other
cultures, languages, and parts of the world often enjoy pro bono representation of
immigrants.
Models for pro bono immigration networks vary but typically have the following fea-
tures: (1) a strategy for recruiting volunteer lawyers; (2) intake and screening of potential pro
bono clients according to case type, level of difficulty, and income conducted by experienced
attorneys or accredited representatives; (3) a foundational training program and regular fol-
low-up trainings in particular skills or substantive areas of law; (4) matching of attorneys
with no previous practice in immigration law with more experienced mentor attorneys who
can help oversee the progress of the case, provide assistance with preparation tasks, and
sometimes, serve as second-chair.
Volunteer attorney networks operate in most states, although some groups are very
small. Most are limited with respect to both the kinds of cases they accept and their geo-
graphic reach. In Idaho, for example, a group of attorneys, students, faculty, community-
based and religious organizations, Idaho Legal Aid Services, the Boise Mexican consulate
and the Idaho State Bar Volunteer Lawyer Program (IVLP), concerned with the dearth of
competent, affordable representation in removal proceedings came together in 2009 to de-
velop a pro bono program that held its first training and accepted its first cases in January
2010.413 Because Idaho is largely rural and its capital, Boise, has the largest concentration of
attorneys as well as the state's only immigration court, representation is largely limited to
immigrants residing in the greater Boise area.4 1 4 The Idaho network typically accepts cases
involving removal proceedings in which individuals have relatively straightforward claims for
relief based on cancellation of removal, asylum, family-based adjustment of status, and the
Violence Against Women Act.4 1 5
413. See Mikela French & Kristina Wilson, Idaho Immigration Law Pro Bono Network: Answering the Call, in 52
THE IDAHO STATE BAR ADVOCATE 33-34 (Oct. 2009) (discussing the pro bono program in Idaho).
414. One of the authors helped establish a pro bono program in New York City during the late 1980s and Idaho's
volunteer network, and can state with confidence that the hurdles for creating organized pro bono representation in a
rural region with little public transportation or major highways are more daunting in every respect. Lawyers' offices are
far-flung, attorneys often have to drive long distances to attend trainings and immigration court hearings, and clients
frequently live in isolated areas without access to transportation. Attorneys in rural areas are typically solo practitioners
or belong to very small law offices. Rural lawyers also often have little financial cushion or the time required to take on
deportation cases, which are usually time-consuming.
415. See French, supra note 413, at 33-34.
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While the Idaho effort is relatively recent, volunteer attorney initiatives to represent
immigrants have been in existence in other areas, especially urban areas, for much longer. In
New York and San Francisco, for example, such pro bono networks date back to the
earlyl980s. New York recently announced ambitious new programs, to be implemented
through public and private partnerships, which will provide additional representation to im-
migrants in removal proceedings, especially to detainees and those living outside of metro-
politan areas.4 1 6
1. Pro Bono Programs Created by the Federal Courts of Appeal: The Ninth
Circuit Example
A number of federal courts have created pro bono programs designed to increase
appellate representation for low-income or indigent individuals in a variety of matters,
including immigration. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has one of the most
ambitious pro bono programs. It was established in 1993 to provide "pro bono counsel to pro
se parties with meritorious or complex appeals, to provide a valuable learning experience to
young attorneys and law students, and to assist the court in processing pro se civil appeals
more equitably and efficiently." 4 17 During the last decade, immigration matters have become
an increasingly large part of the pro bono docket.
Cases are pre-screened by court staff attorneys. 4 18 Those selected for the program
typically "present[] issues of first impression or some complexity or otherwise warranting
further briefing and oral argument." 4 19 The court's pro bono staff works with members of the
bar association and law school clinics to recruit qualified volunteers to handle the cases
chosen for the program.4 2 0 Attorneys who participate in the program gain valuable appellate
experience, including a guaranteed oral argument. 42 1
The Ninth Circuit pro bono program has created a win-win situation: it helps expand
quality representation for indigent individuals, provides attorneys and law clinic students
with an unparalleled opportunity to hone their appellate skills, and helps manage the court's
burgeoning pro se caseload. The need for the program is particularly evident in immigration
matters. As of 2005, immigration cases comprised approximately 48% of the Ninth Circuit's
416. Kirk Semple, Plan Would Provide Help to Contest Deportation Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/11/28/nyregion/plan-would-add-lawyers-to-contest-deportation-cases.html.
417. U.S. CouRTr o APPEAIS FOR TIE7- NINTH CIRCUFf, PRO BONO PROGRAM HANDBOK 1 (2012).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 5-6.
421. Id.
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docket, which, evidence suggests, has remained roughly consistent since then.422 Recognizing
the complexity of most immigration appeals, the Ninth Circuit facilitates more effective pro
bono representation by publishing a comprehensive outline, which synthesizes precedent
decisions in procedural and substantive areas of immigration law, and has developed an
arrangement with staff attorneys at the ILRC to mentor pro bono attorneys representing
immigrant petitioners for review.
2. The BIA
Established in 2001, the BIA Pro Bono Project initially focused on increasing pro
bono representation for pro se detainees who sought BIA review of immigration judge
decisions or wanted to respond to an ICE appeal. 4 23 The project's scope was later expanded
to increase pro bono representation for non-detainees. 4 24 The project matches selected
unrepresented appellants with volunteer lawyers, with the goal that attorney involvement in
writing an appeal brief will provide higher quality appeals and, thus, facilitate "a smoother
and more effective case review by the Board." 425 It relies on a BIA Pro Bono Program
Coordinator "who spends about 10% of his work year on the project," and an office
paralegal who "devotes approximately 30% of her time to the project," thus avoiding
interference with their assigned responsibilities.4 26 Volunteer and contract attorneys from the
private bar, including lawyers with CLINIC, AILA, and National Immigration Project of the
National Lawyers Guild, help screen and review cases for placement with pro bono
attorneys. 42 7 Although a positive contribution to capacity-building efforts, the BIA program
can assist just a small fraction of those who need help with appeals to the BIA.4 2 8
B. Federally Recognized Programs and Accredited Representatives
Creating federally recognized programs with trained and accredited non-attorney
representatives is an important piece of increasing competent free or low cost representation
in immigration cases. CLINIC has been a major player in facilitating the growth of recogni-
tion and accreditation initiatives nationwide. In addition to providing immigration law train-
422. Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts, L.A. TIMFS (May 2,
2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/02/local/me-backlog2.
423. Bo. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS, U.S. DEP'T OF Jusnce., THFE BIA PiRo BoNo PROJEC Is SuccEssuui 1-2 (2004)
[hereinafter TiH BIA PRO BoNo PROJECF IS SUCCESSFUL].
424. See id. at 4 (listing non-detained cases as one category the project now covers).
425. Id. at 2.
426. Id. at 3.
427. Id. at 3.
428. For example, from June 2003 through May 2004, the project screened 421 cases of which ninety-nine were
selected to match with pro bono counsel. Id. at 22. Ninety lawyers indicated a desire to represent the pro se appellant
and only forty-seven filed notices to appear as counsel of record. Id.
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ing and support for recognition and accreditation in Catholic Charities offices across the
country, CLINIC provides assistance to other community-based organizations seeking fed-
eral recognition and accreditation of qualified employees. Among other capacity building
resources, CLINIC created an online "Toolkit for BIA Recognition and Accreditation,"
which provides a step-by-step guide for successfully applying for recognition and accredita-
tion, self-directed e-learning courses, trainings, and webinars on the fundamentals of immi-
gration law, and links to additional resources. 4 29 CLINIC also publishes a comprehensive
online manual entitled "Managing an Immigration Program: Steps for Creating and Increas-
ing Legal Capacity." 430 ILRC also offers excellent training resources, including 40-hour on-
site courses for individuals seeking accreditation. 4 31 Private and not-for-profit attorneys, the
ABA, AILA, and state and local bar associations also offer trainings for individuals em-
ployed by recognized agencies who seek accreditation and provide supervision for already
accredited representatives.
The Executive Office for Immigration Review publishes practical suggestions about
the recognition and accreditation processes, including its "Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs) about the Recognition and Accreditation (R&A) Program" and publicly available
power-point presentations.4 32 Finally, USCIS offers useful information about recognition and
accreditation. 4 33
C. Law School Clinics
Most U.S. law schools run legal clinics which provide students the opportunity to
represent clients in actual cases or other legal matters for indigent or low-income individuals
and communities under the supervision of law professors who are licensed attorneys. Law
clinics allow students to learn how to be attorneys through structured and intensive hands-on
experience in applying theory and doctrine to facts that involve real clients, while also in-
creasing access to justice for those most in need. Clinics aim to instill in students an apprecia-
tion of the importance of pro bono service. Approximately 115 of the country's law schools
429. Toolkit for BIA Recognition and Accreditation, CAnI iouc LEGAL IMMIGR. NET1WORK, INC., https://cliniclegal.
org/resources/toolkit-bia-recogition-accreditation (last visited on Oct. 26, 2013).
430. STARTING A LEGAL IMMIGRATION PROGRAM, supra note 411.
431. BIA Accreditation, IMMIGR. LEGAL REs. CTR., http://www.ilrc.org/info-on-immigration-law/bia-accreditation
(last visited Oct. 26, 2013).
432. See Recognition & Accreditation (R&A) Program, ExEc. OFFcE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEw, U.S. DE"T OF JiUS-
TicF, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ra.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (providing links to those documents).
433. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERvs., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., APPENDIX 12-2: WORKSHEET FOR
REQUESTIS FOR RECOGNITION AND ACCREDITATION PROCESSING AND PROCEDURES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/
ilink/docView/AFM/DATAOBJECTS/Appx.12_2.pdf (providing relevant information).
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now offer immigration clinics.434 Most of these are live client clinics in which students re-
present immigrants in venues that include USCIS, immigration courts, the BIA, and the
federal courts. Although these clinics meet only a tiny fraction of the need for representation
in immigration matters, they have a multiplier effect because participants often go on to
practice immigration law full- or part-time, take on pro bono immigration cases, clerk for
judges who hear immigration-related matters, find employment in government agencies that
require knowledge of immigration law, or become involved in capacity-building initiatives in
other ways.4 35
CONCLUSION
The notario problem has been likened to the arcade game "Whac-a Mole," in which
"each time an adversary is 'whacked' it pops up again somewhere else." 4 3 6 In the UPIL
context, subduing the mole requires sustained, collaborative action, strategic teamwork, and
a variety of tools.
The approach we have outlined includes remedial, compensatory, preventive, and
deterrent legal methods as well as broader advocacy techniques. We call for a more coherent
process for reporting allegations of notario fraud, expanding and rationalizing opportunities
for victims to obtain legal redress, and improving the regulation of immigration law practice.
Equally important to an effective anti-notario strategy are targeted community education
initiatives coupled with practical guidance for immigration consumers who seek not only to
avoid scams but also to find remedies for harm already inflicted. Finally, an effective cam-
paign against UPIL must include further development of capacity-building programs to meet
the demand for competent immigration representation.
These measures are increasingly urgent in light of current immigration reform pro-
posals, which are likely to contain opportunities for several million immigrants to apply for
lawful immigration status-and therefore, an unparalleled opportunity for fraudsters to take
advantage of immigration consumers. Through its explanation of existing strategies to com-
bat UPIL, identification of their strengths and weaknesses, and recommendations for im-
provement, we hope that this article contributes to the fortification of anti-notario initiatives.
434. See Immigration Prof, List of Law School Immigration Law Clinics - Updated, IMMIGRATIONPROFBiLoc (Oct.
15, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2012/10/list-of-immigration-law-clinics-updated.html (providing
a link to download the list of schools with immigration clinics).
435. The Idaho immigration Law Pro Bono Network, for example, got off the ground with the help of former
University of Idaho Immigration Law Clinic interns. See French, supra note 413.
436. See Whac-a-Mole, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whac-A-Mole (last visited Oct. 26, 2013) (describ-
ing the "Whac-a-Mole" game).
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